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Combat Trauma and Tragic Catharsis: An Aristotelian Account of Tragedy and Trauma
Eddie Hoffmann
12 January 2015

γλυκύ δ᾽ἀπείρῳ πόλεμος.
πεπειραμένων δέ τις ταρβεῖ προσιόντα νιν καρδία περισσῶς.
~Πινδάρος
(Fragment 110)
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Only after the horrors of Vietnam did the emotional trials of war seem to finally settle
into the American popular consciousness, and by now, psychologists have settled on a clinical
definition of what they call Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, or PTSD. Given our own very
recent recognition of what I will henceforward refer to as combat trauma, many attribute the
phenomenon to the conditions particular to modern war.1 While many changes have occurred in
the way soldiers fight in recent years, the nature of war seems to stay the same more than it
changes. Thus, in World War I, combat trauma was known as shell shock. Ernst Jünger
describes one German soldier in his account of his war experiences, Storm of Steel:
Sitting next to him in the roadside ditch, I questioned him avidly…and got from him
a grey tale of days hunkered in craters, with no outside contact or communications
lines, of incessant attacks, fields of corpses and crazy thirst, of the wounded left to
die, and more of the same. The impassive features under the rim of the steel helmet
and the monotonous voice accompanied by the noise of the battle made a ghostly
impression on us. A few days had put their stamp on the runner, who was to escort us
into the realm of flame, setting him inexorably apart from us.
‘If a man falls, he’s left to lie. No one can help. No one knows if he’ll return alive.
Every day we’re attacked, but they won’t get through. Everyone knows this is life
and death.’ Nothing was left in his voice but equanimity, apathy; fire had burned
everything else out of it.2
This brave soldier’s traumatic emotional injury had left him a shell of his former self. In his
Henry IV, Shakespeare describes its symptoms with eerie similarity to the modern formulation of
the symptoms of PTSD: “In faint slumbers I by thee have watch’d,/ and heard thee murmur iron
tales of wars…/The spirit within thee hath been so at war/And thus hath so bestirr’d thee in thy
sleep,/That beads of sweat have stood upon they brow,/Like bubbles in late-disturbed stream.”3
Even ancient Greeks seem to have experienced combat trauma. Jonathan Shay’s analysis
of the Iliad and Odyssey, in Achilles in Vietnam and Odysseus in America, respectively, indicate
Psychologist John Shay insists that this is the more accurate rendering: PTSD makes what is in reality “moral
injury” sound like a disease. For the purposes of this paper, combat trauma is a moral and emotional injury induced
by the stress of combat and exacerbated by factors such as betrayal and loss of a close friend. Shay 1994:28-32.
2
Jünger 2004:92
3
Shay 1994:166 Shay quotes Henry IV, Part I act 2, sc. 3, lines 40-62.
1
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that the ancient Greeks knew combat trauma and its attendant sufferings well.4 Shay compared
the experience of the veterans in his clinic to those of Achilles and Odysseus, noting that the
similarities between these trauma patients and accounts of the Greek heroes of the Iliad and
Odyssey were too close to pass by. The representation of trauma is not limited to the epic genre.
Sophocles’ Ajax and Philoktetes both portray soldiers who have been severely psychologically
injured by their own sufferings and by their commanders’ and comrades’ betrayal.
Noting these themes in tragedy, classicist and director Brian Doerries has staged several
productions of Greek tragedies for veterans of America’s most recent wars. The results were
astounding. In discussion after the production, soldiers openly shared sentiments in front of a
crowd of several hundred that they had perhaps never shared with intimates before.5 The plays
allowed them to see their own failures and successes in a new light; they retouched the ugliness
of their sufferings and made that ugliness sublime. As a result, the soldiers were able to share
experiences and address issues that they had bottled up inside their own souls. Some weight that
had prevented them from even discussing their experiences had been lifted from their souls
through the force of the dramas they witnessed. Some excess of fear or lack of pity had been
moderated; they were once again more themselves than they had been for a long, weary time.
Doerries’ productions achieved an element of ancient drama that scholars have long
sought to understand definitively. It is what the ancients used to call catharsis (καθάρσις),
literally, purification. Since Aristotle penned the Poetics, scholars have debated exactly what he
meant by that term. In modern times, most classicists have discussed that subject relying
primarily on a very narrow context for their research: most limit themselves to the Poetics itself;
some of the more adventurous reach out into the Ethics, Politics, or Metaphysics to bolster their
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Shay 1994; Shay 2000
Doerries 2015b:88
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interpretation. Few indeed have sought to understand the political context of Aristotle’s work on
tragedy in order to locate the philosopher’s work in its own political and cultural conditions,
however. Aristotle speaks of a catharsis of pity and fear, but few have asked whence excesses of
pity and fear and other like emotions likely came, and whether their source might tell us
something about catharsis.
I will claim that the sources of excesses and deficiencies in the emotions proper to
tragedy do indeed help us to understand the process of their reformation through catharsis. With
my first chapter, I will begin my argument with a summary of the evidence indicating that it is
indeed likely that Greeks of the classical era suffered from combat trauma. Next, I will examine
the question of the relation of Attic tragedy as a genre to combat trauma. It is evident upon even
a cursory reading of certain plays, like Sophocles’ Ajax and Philoktetes, that they speak to
soldiers scarred by war. I will argue further, claiming that even those tragedies seeming most
distant from conflict would still resonate with the experience of the soldier and begin to heal his
emotional wounds.
The tragedies carry out this task through catharsis. Thus in the second chapter we must
turn to Aristotle, and examine his Poetics to understand the philosophical backdrop of tragedy
and especially tragic catharsis. Having established from this analysis that, at least in Aristotle’s
account, catharsis is the end of tragedy, I will turn to the broader Aristotelian corpus to establish
the nature of the end of tragedy. Through this examination, I establish the nature of catharsis. I
determine that catharsis is the process of healing injuries to the spirited portion of the soul, which
the Greeks called thumos. The healing that takes place restores the thumetic emotions to the
mean of virtue, thus rehabilitating the soul. My fourth and final chapter will examine the process
by which this rehabilitation took place. Here, I will analyze the theories of catharsis common in
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the scholarly tradition, examining their strengths and shortcomings in relation to my own claims
regarding the nature of catharsis. Finally, I will present my own hypothesis regarding the
process of catharsis. Based on the clinical practice of Shay and the theater experience Doerries, I
conclude that catharsis functioned through the formation and communalization of traumatic
narratives.
The beauty of Greek philosophy is that it remains inseparable from life. As a result, this
research into the nature of tragedy in general, and catharsis especially, transcends mere scholarly
pursuits. The Greeks still have many lessons to teach us, for better or worse. We have learned
all too well and seem to be unable to shake their penchant for combat. Trapped in conflict after
weary conflict, we stand in desperate need of their ability to reconstruct the virtue of veterans
whose hearts tremble at the approach of war.

6
Chapter I: Combat Trauma and Tragedy
Before turning to an interpretation of catharsis that takes its bearings from the Greek
experience of combat trauma, it is necessary to establish that the ancient Greeks would have
experienced combat trauma, and that tragedy served as therapy for that trauma. It is of course
impossible to diagnose the subjective mental states of men who have been dead for millennia to
determine if they suffered from trauma. To further complicate our quest, historical sources, at
first glance, seem rather barren of information regarding the experience of the individual soldier.
Interested in grander geopolitical and moral themes, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon
often tend to miss the gory details that give us a better feel for the soldier’s experience.
However, these historical sources do describe a scheme of battle that was ugly, brutal, and
deadly. Despite this fact, certain authors claim that ancient soldiers might not have experienced
combat trauma in the same way as modern soldiers do, due to cultural differences between our
society and theirs. In order to refute such claims, it will be necessary to turn to Greek literature,
particularly lyric poetry and tragedy, which does demonstrate an understanding not only the of
the horrors of war, but also of the psychological cost of those horrors. I conclude that Greeks of
the classical period did indeed experience combat trauma and that tragic catharsis served as a
therapy for that trauma.
Phalanx warfare was a brutal, gory, and ugly method of combat. In general, we think that
the average battle would have occurred in roughly the following way: two armies would
normally meet on normally a level plain, on which large phalanxes could maneuver easily.6

6

We are far from an exact and certain understanding of how phalanx warfare worked. A complete scholarly
analysis is regrettably out of the scope of this chapter, which seeks but to justify that Greek combat soldiers did
indeed suffer from combat trauma and that tragic catharsis in some way treated that trauma. For example, Victor
Hanson (1989) argues that the typical othismos (literally, “pushing,” the final clash of phalanxes) ended in a massive
shoving match (a kind of reverse tug of war) between the two masses of men. Christopher Mathew (Mathew 2009)
argues that the phalanxes would have stopped a spear length away from their opponents and exchanged spear thrusts
from that distance. I tend to favor Hanson’s view in the material that follows, but it is outside the scope of this

7
When ready, the armies would move toward each other at a measured pace, conserving their
energy for a final push. At that point, the forces would clash. After a brief pushing and shoving
match or exchange of blows, one phalanx or the other would have to give. Individual excellence
could not have had as much of a part to play in phalanx warfare as brute laws of human inertia
and force, inertia and force that left men dead by the hundreds. Two phalanxes of men battering
into each other could create unimaginable carnage. Victor Hanson, basing his description on the
histories of Xenophon and Thucydides, provides a description of what an actual battle might
have looked like:
The collision must have been an unbelievable sight. The spears of both sides were
nearing each other at some five miles an hour. At Koroneia in 394, Agesilaos’ men
“ran” to meet the enemy; when they came “within spear thrust,” the enemy collapsed
from the very shock. (Xen. Hell. 4.3.17) Indeed, the narratives of the battles of
Mantinea, Delion, Nemea, and Leuktra, not to mention the accounts of earlier (often
nameless) conflicts in the Lyric poets, make no sense unless we understand that both
sides literally collided together, creating the awful thud of forceful impact at the
combined rate of ten miles per hour. 7
If one phalanx did not collapse immediately, a brief period of pushing, straining, and
shoving would follow, in which hoplites would more or less blindly stab their spears or swords at
the mass of men in front of them while being shoved forward by the weight of row upon row of
men behind them, the center of their comrades’ shields planted squarely against their backs. In
such mass warfare, any loss of ground would tend to escalate exponentially, sometimes turning a
withdrawal into a retreat and a retreat into a rout. At this moment the winning phalanx could
unleash its pent up fury, hacking and stabbing the now unprotected flanks and backs of the
retreating mass of men. Xenophon in Hellenica 4.4.11-12 writes of just such a situation in a

thesis to provide a detailed analysis of phalanx warfare. Fortunately, the specifics are immaterial to my case: the
general claims that form the premise of my argument in the following paragraphs remain true whatever specific
views we may take.
7
Hanson 1989:157
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Spartan victory over Argos. The Argive phalanx had collapsed, and the Spartans seized the
opportunity:
οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐκ ἠπόρουν τίνα ἀποκτείνοιεν: ἔδωκε γὰρ τότε γε ὁ θεὸς
αὐτοῖς ἔργον οἷον οὐδ᾽ ηὔξαντό ποτ᾽ ἄν. τὸ γὰρ ἐγχειρισθῆναι αὐτοῖς πολεμίων
πλῆθος πεφοβημένον, ἐκπεπληγμένον, τὰ γυμνὰ παρέχον, ἐπὶ τὸ μάχεσθαι οὐδένα
τρεπόμενον, εἰς δὲ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι πάντας πάντα ὑπηρετοῦντας, πῶς οὐκ ἄν τις θεῖον
ἡγήσαιτο; τότε γοῦν οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλοὶ ἔπεσον ὥστε εἰθισμένοι ὁρᾶν οἱ
ἄνθρωποι σωροὺς σίτου, ξύλων, λίθων, τότε ἐθεάσαντο σωροὺς νεκρῶν. ἀπέθανον
δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐν τῷ λιμένι τῶν Βοιωτῶν φύλακες, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν τειχῶν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ τέγη
τῶν νεωσοίκων ἀναβάντες. (Hellenica 4.4.12)
As for the Spartans, they were at no loss about whom to kill next…Here was a great
mass of their enemies delivered over to them in a state of utter panic, offering their
unprotected sides, with no one making the least effort to fight and everyone doing
everything possible to ensure his own destruction: what can one call this except an
instance of divine intervention? Certainly on this occasion so many fell in such a
short time that the dead bodies seemed to be heaped together like heaps of corn or
piles of wood or stones.8
Even if such carnage was the exception in a hoplite battle rather than the rule, the potential for its
occurrence was always present, and thus the fear that such could happen would be ever present.
Instability in war contributes to traumatic experience as much as violence and brutality.
The Greeks would have experienced radical changes in the way war was fought throughout the
classical period. Accustomed to the set norms and methods of phalanx warfare described above,
the Greeks faced an entirely new foe and way of fighting in the Persian Wars. Herodotus takes
care to emphasize the fearsomeness of fighting the Persians, an unfamiliar and deadly foe, for the
first time. (Herodotus Histories 6.94) His descriptions of the battle of Marathon are mythic in
tone, including accounts of soldiers being blinded by fear of monstrous enemies, and casualty
figures among the Persian forces of epic proportions. (Herodotus Histories 6.94-105)
Throughout his narrative of the rest of the war, he emphasizes that the Greeks had been
threatened as never before. (Herodotus Histories 8.97-104) Both the actual experience of fighting
8

Translated in Rauflaab 2015:23 Here, the phalanx collapsed in not exactly the way described in the general
summary above; however, the result (a broken phalanx being attacked by a sound one) was the same.
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and the potential outcomes of the war were more dreadful in the Persian Wars than they would
have been in the internal conflicts of archaic Greece, which tended to be short-lived and,
compared to the horrific carnage of the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, relatively bloodless.
Having once tasted of the power of unrestricted warfare against the Persians, the Greeks
turned the new horror of total war on each other. This changed method of war came complete
with new fighting technologies. Thucydides describes, for example, the use of updated and
horrible flame-throwing weaponry employed by the Corinthians at Delium in revenge for the
Athenian violation of the temple precincts by fortifying the temple for their protection.9 The old,
simple war in which two masses of men would rush at each other on a level plain with no other
weapons than swords and spears, was gone for good. New and more deadly ways of fighting
would have added uncertainty to the many horrors of combat, making the experience of fighting
more traumatic than ever before.
The effect of war upon an individual is often heightened by that war’s effect on his society.
It is useful, then to turn briefly to the question of ancient war’s impact on the polis. War would
have had an all-encompassing impact on civic life. Kurt Raaflaub writes that “of the years
between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, Athens fought some kind of war in two out of
every three years and the latter lasted 27 years.”10 The casualty figures of these wars stretch
belief, but accurate or not, they reflect the very real magnitude of grief and loss. Raaflaub goes
on to write that single campaigns, like the Athenian expedition to Egypt or to Sicily could cost
huge losses (8000 and 10,000 respectively). The casualties on the Egyptian expedition would
figure at one in every seven or eight adult male citizens. Raaflaub notes that
by the end of the Peloponnesian War, the citizen body had shrunk to less than half its
prewar level. As Peter Hunt observes, if prorated the Athenian losses at Chaeronea
9

Monoson 2014:138
Rauflaab 2015:23
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are comparable to the losses of the main combatants in the entire First World War.
The total figures of the Peloponnesian War, again prorated, dwarf anything that is
known from modern warfare.11
For the Greeks of the classical age, war was not the exception but the rule, and when it occurred,
its aftermath could destroy the whole framework of civic life.
Furthermore, though hoplite warfare would cause less civilian casualties than modern
warfare as a general rule, this norm did not always hold. Thucydides describes an incident
during the Peloponnesian war in which civil strife broke out in Corcyra. The Athenian admiral
Eurymedon had approached the city with a fleet of triremes, bringing the latent political turmoil
to a head. The result was shocking (Histories, 3.81):
Ἡμέρας τε ἑπτά, ἃς ἀφικόμενος ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ παρέμεινε,
Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον, τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν
ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τὸν δῆμον καταλύουσιν, ἀπέθανον δέ τινες καὶ ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἕνεκα,
καὶ ἄλλοι χρημάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων· 3.81.5πᾶσά τε ἰδέα
κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ οἷον φιλεῖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ
ἔτι περαιτέρω. καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ παῖδα ἀπέκτεινε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ
πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δέ τινες καὶ περιοικοδομηθέντες ἐν τοῦ Διονύσου τῷ ἱερῷ
ἀπέθανον. οὕτως ὠμὴ <ἡ> στάσις προυχώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς
πρώτη ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν
οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς
ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.
And for the seven days together that Eurymedon stayed there with his sixty galleys,
the Corcyraeans did nothing but kill such of their city as they took to be their
enemies, laying to their charge a practice to have everted the popular government.
Amongst whom some were slain upon private hatred and some by their debtors for
the money which they had lent them. All forms of death were then seen;
and…whatsoever had happened at any time happened also then, and more. For the
father slew his son; men were dragged out of the temples and slain hard by; and
some immured in the temple of Bacchus died within it. So cruel was this sedition and
seemed so the more because it was the first.12
This picture of slaughter, unique not because it was the only similar incident, as Thucydides
points out, but because it was simply the first, provides yet another perspective on ancient war.
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The stench and horror of the battlefield are to be expected. But bringing the sights, sounds, and
smells of death into cities, homes, and temples is all the more horrifying. Sacking of cities and
massacre of civilians was hardly widespread in the ancient world, but when it did occur, as the
excerpt from Histories makes clear, the violence would have been extreme. In sum, historical
evidence clearly points to a world at constant war, and a type of war nearly unmatched in
brutality and violence.
Even giving this general knowledge about a soldier’s operational and tactical
environment, recreating the subjective experience of an individual living hundreds of years
before Christ is no easy task. Given a political culture and society so radically unlike ours, one
may wonder how different the experience of war may have been for an individual soldier. Many
of the factors that seem to cause combat trauma in modern war seem remarkably absent in
ancient conflict. Some authors argue that such factors would make combat trauma either
radically different or so rare as to be negligible in its social effects. One proponent of this
position, Jason Crowley, examines Athenian culture in particular, seeking to demonstrate that
our notions of combat trauma could not apply to the Athenian soldier. He claims that Athenian
performative culture, unlike our present post-Christian society, encouraged bravery and violence,
and that this cultural environment would cause radically unlike emotional states in soldiers at
war from the experience of modern soldiers. He concludes that “the norms and values the
Athenian hoplite carried with him into battle were strikingly different from those of the
American infantryman, so too was the social environment in which he fought.”13 Not only his
social formation, but also the very landscape of battle, Crowley argues, would contribute to the
hoplite’s immunity from combat trauma. The Athenian soldier would be deployed with those of
his own deme or tribe, and serve in a cohesive unit of the same friends whose company he would
13

Crowley 2014:113
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have enjoyed at home. The type of battle in which he fought and the weapons that he used
would place the hoplite in control of his surroundings, Crowley argues, making him able to face
the enemy by his choice, or if defeated, flee by his choice.
Before I begin to address his claims in detail, it must be admitted that Crowley does make
several good arguments regarding the comparatively short distance which Greek soldiers would
fight from their homes, the temporal brevity of their expeditions, the paucity of night operations,
and the direct nature of phalanx warfare. Exceptions to his claims do, of course, exist. The
Sicilian Expedition, for example, led Athenians far from their homes for a long period of time
(many of them, of course, never to return). His argument is sufficient to demonstrate, perhaps,
that Greek warriors would have suffered combat trauma in smaller percentages than American
soldiers. Even if this were the case, however, the percentage of the Athenian population that was
traumatized would likely still remain higher than in modern America, given that every citizen
was a soldier.14
We shall respond to Crowley’s last major argument first. Crowley claims that the
individual soldier, is, in a sense, the master of his own fate, and is thus less susceptible to combat
trauma than the modern soldier. He claims:
Specifically, during main-force encounters, the Athenian hoplite could eliminate the
threat he faced from enemy hoplites by closing with and killing them or, if
overmatched, he could break contact under the cover of friendly cavalry and light
infantry. Indeed, even during a tactical worst-case scenario…the only option
available to the hoplite, uncontrolled flight, usually facilitated by the abandonment of
the shield, was itself a form of direct action.15

14

I rely on this fact throughout my thesis, and will justify it here. The oath of citizenship, taken by an Athenian at
age 18, was framed in military terms. The situation was reversed from our modern way of thought: we think
perhaps of becoming soldiers, being citizens by birth; for the Athenians, being a soldier was a societal pre-requisite
to becoming a citizen. Military service lasted from age 18 to 60, with the last ten years of that time in reserve status.
Desertion, cowardice, and other military infractions were punished with similar penalties as those imposed on
thieves and other criminals. (Ridley 1979:511-12)
15
Crowley 2014:117
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These statements simply do not match the realities of hoplite warfare. The Athenian hoplite
could do little of his own volition. The Athenian phalanx operated as a unit. The hoplite in the
first line of a phalanx has but one choice: to move forward. The entire purpose of a phalanx is to
eliminate direct choice and individual heroic action, or at least minimize its importance.16 One is
in complete reliance on those around him. Members at the rear of the phalanx would simply
push forward those behind, creating a collective momentum. Nowhere would an individual
decision be more difficult to enact. Control of the environment would be impossible. With a
heavy helmet obscuring the hoplite’s vision and making hearing difficult, seeing anything clearly
beyond the foe straight ahead would have been difficult and hearing anything over the din of
clashing armor and shields would have likely been impossible. Victor Hanson writes in the
following way of the front-line soldiers’ experience at the moment of the charge:
Were they capable of either sober reflection on the dangers of the situation, or even a
clearheaded sense of the natural instinct to avoid a collision, to such a degree that
they might hesitate, bunch up, step back, or run away? When the hoplite was in the
final steps of a hundred-yard run, his adrenaline and the laws of motion made
continued movement forward more likely than a sudden stop. Besides, his vision and
hearing were too poor and he no longer had a clear visual picture of the trouble
awaiting him.17
If Hanson is correct, once committed to battle, there would be little chance for orderly retreat or
individual action for the individual hoplite or the phalanx as a whole.18 In a situation where the
fate of two masses of men is decided in a kind of brutal shoving-match or short range spear duel,
there is no individual control whatsoever. One may as well speak of a single train car deciding
to abstain from a collision as a single hoplite exercising individual judgment in phalanx warfare.

16
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For the “mechanics of hoplite warfare” Crowley curiously references Hanson (among others), who seems to
disagree with his position at every turn, as we shall see. See Crowley 2014:124 n. 112.
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Even if such a physical possibility existed, the mental state of a hoplite in battle would
hardly be conducive to individual decisions to direct action. The sensory overload in those
moments would have been horrifying and overwhelming. Hanson speculates as follows:
Sweating in earnest, their vision obscured by the helmet, dust and bodies in motion
everywhere, they were captives in confused humanity as hearing, bad to begin with,
now was lost entirely amid the noise, much of it coming from the banging of enemy
spear tips on their own armor. For the men in the initial three ranks the view of the
fighting, then, would be the blurred shapes of the enemy at their face—and at their
feet—their entire perception of the world reduced to a few feet of the ground ahead.
There was also an increased smell of sweat from the thousands toiling in the sun, the
odor of blood and entrails from fresh, open wounds, and the occasional scent of
excrement among the fearful or the recently killed—though possibly the sense of
smell was dulled along with hearing and vision.19
Whatever the exact sensations that the hoplite experienced, the range of emotions from
the adrenaline rush before and during the onslaught followed by the horror of the initial shock,
then the blood-lusty exultation of the pursuing pitted against the abject terror of the pursued form
an emotional melee that baffles our description or understanding. The noblest of warriors would
be helplessly caught in this mad communal rush before, during, and after the meeting of the two
phalanxes. What the soldier might have done was as much out of his control as in it.
To sum up the physical and emotional experience of the hoplite othismos as best we can,
Vietnam veteran and classicist Lawrence Tritle writes:
the sights and sounds of this fight—like any battle, ancient or modern—are nearly
beyond the comprehension of the inexperienced. The battleground itself would have
become…littered with bodies of the wounded, dying, and dead, making it difficult to
walk and fight at the same time. Blood and viscera would have made the ground
slippery and the air foul. The noise and confusion would have been bewildering and
disorienting all at once.20
Such a situation is far distant from Crowley’s orderly picture of ancient war. Physically and
psychologically, the hoplite would be carried along in the general wave of war, no more able to
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control his environment or respond to that environment with “direct action” in classical times
than can soldiers of more modern times. In Crowley’s “tactical worst-case scenario,” where the
“direct action” of flight in terror is the hoplites’ only option, there is again little consolation. The
action is a direct one, but that in no way allows the individual to be a free agent who can control
his circumstances, thus reducing (as Crowley would argue) his risk of trauma. As Crowley
admits, the hoplite in such a circumstance normally has but one choice: to flee for his life.
Crowley’s argument regarding the presence of friends in combat is also unconvincing. As
Shay argues in Achilles in Vietnam, the death of a close friend is one of the leading factors in
causing combat trauma.21 One need look no further than Achilles’ loss of Patroclus in the Iliad to
realize that the Greeks knew the devastation that the loss of a close friend could cause. The
presence of friends makes the stress of combat easier to bear, of course, but their loss exacerbates
the already powerful emotional turmoil of war. A great part of the power of philia between
soldiers comes from the mutual defense they provide each other in war.22 The hoplite phalanx is,
of course, incredibly dependent on each soldier playing his part for the defense of the whole. If
Shay’s experience with Vietnam veterans is in any way indicative of the ancient situation, the
bonds of philia within the phalanx must have been unimaginably strong. The dissolution of such
bonds through death in combat would likely have often caused severe grief and rage, two chief
sources of combat trauma. The presence of other friends, no doubt, would have mitigated this
trauma, but probably could not have eliminated it.
Perhaps more worrying, however, are Crowley’s claims that the culture of Athens would
have eliminated combat trauma. Crowley argues that Athenian culture served to negate certain of
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the principle factors that lead to combat trauma in modern America, and that the Greeks
therefore had no experience with it. Interestingly, it is possible to turn his arguments entirely on
their head. Greek culture’s outstanding ability to prevent and treat trauma through military
organization and culture (which was so effective, Crowley argues, that combat trauma was
irrelevant for the Greeks) ought not to demonstrate unfamiliarity with combat trauma, but rather
an extreme familiarity with it. One portion of Greek society that mitigated the effects of combat
trauma, as I will argue, was Attic tragedy, but as Crowley does indeed point out, a host of
societal factors in Athenian society would have served to alleviate the stress of war by lending it
cultural expression.
One of these expressions of trauma is found in lyric poetry. This should hardly surprise
us; after World War I it was the poetry of Wilfred Owen, Siegfried Sassoon, and Robert Graves,
among others, that exposed “shell shock” for what it was.23 Their poems revealed sadness and
loss that the triumphal narratives of politics often sublimated. Of Greek lyricists, Pindar
famously wrote, “war is sweet to the untried; but the veteran – his heart trembles merely at its
approach.” (Pindar, Fragment 10)24 Simonides penned the following epigram: “Once war raged:
arrows and a rain of blood,/the breasts of men opened like the clouds./No longer are there men.
Lifeless stones recall/ them, living, ranked across the dust.”25 The clear and ringing notes of
sadness speak to more than his recognition of glorious death: they bear a deep expression of the
finality and tragedy of death in war. The inscription on the grave of one Protomachos is more
touching still: “Said Protomachos, from his father’s arms/His lovely youth withdrawing with
each breath:/‘Timenorides, forever you’ll regret/Your dear son’s boldness, his disdain for
For the influence of the First World War on poetry, and that poetry’s influence on our outlook, see The Great War
and Modern Memory (Fussell 1975)
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death.’”26 Simonides’ epigrams speak to an understanding of the glory of war, but also an
understanding of the cost of war: we shall regret the boldness, the glory of our soldiers, because
that boldness leads to their deaths.
For Simonides, death in battle is surely glorious (one need only read his epigram on the
Spartan fallen to infer as much)27 but glory is not the whole of the story. Crowley would ask us
to believe that the Greeks understood death in battle not as a premature end but as a happy
consummation of life, and that such an attitude toward death precludes combat trauma. The
Greeks did indeed view death in battle more positively than we 21st century Americans seem to,
but the premise fails to capture the whole of the Greek understanding of death. Simonides’ poem
in memory of Protomachos describes a glorious death: the very name Protomachos means “first
to fight,” or “fore-fighter.” The epigram indicates that death in battle, no matter how glorious,
still leaves intense grief with survivors.28 Simonides’ poetry calls into question Crowley’s undue
emphasis on the glorification of death.
Furthermore, death on the battlefield hardly always fits the perfection embodied by
Protomachus’ beautiful passing. Archilochus remarks in one fragment how “seven men fell dead
when we overtook them at a run, though we the killers are a thousand.”29 Here we hardly see the
glorious death (or the glorious triumph) that Crowley claims was the norm in the Greek view of
war. Lest we simply dismiss Archilochus’ view as uncharacteristic of Greek society, the Spartan
26
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poet Tyrtaios also highlights the difference between the ideal death of tragic nobility and the all
too common brutal reality:
To fall and die among the fore-fighters is a beautiful thing for a brave man who is
doing battle on behalf of his country…Do battle, then young men, standing firm one
beside the other,/check every impulse toward shameful flight or fear, make the spirit
within your hearts great and valiant, and do not love life too much as you fight the
foe. And the older men, whose knees are no longer nimble,/those you must not
abandon in flight, aged as they are; for shameful indeed it is when, fallen among the
fore-fighters, an older man lies dead in front of the young ones, his head already
white and his beard grizzled, breathing out his valiant spirit in the dust, clutching his
bloody genitals in his hands—a sight shameful to look at and worthy of
indignation—his body exposed and naked…So let each man hold to his place with
legs well apart, feet planted on the ground, biting his lip with his teeth.30
Undeniably, Tyrtaios does glorify the death of a young and noble soldier, who has the honor of
consummating his life on the field of battle. But Tyrtaios describes another situation so vividly
that we cannot help but think that he must have seen it firsthand or often heard stories of such
scenes: an old man, clutching a wound in his groin, slowly bleeding out in the dust. Little glory
is left in his poetry here: only bitter ugliness and grief. It is to avoid this very real situation that
Tyrtaios urges on a youth to stand his ground “with legs well apart, feet planted on the ground,
biting his lip with his teeth.” The Greek honor code did seem to form some shield against the
horrors of war; but in this case, Tyrtaios’ argument for practicing the code explicitly recognizes
the fact that the code is imposed because of the very real horrors of war. The code was a way of
mitigating not the horror but the baseness of war. It attempted to wrest beauty from the ugliness
of war. It formed a kind of artificial horizon in which soldiers could bravely live and die.31
It belongs to the province of poetry to make the ugly sublime. That was the task, I will argue, of
the Greek tragic poets.
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A brief look at several Greek tragedies also reveals evidence for a Greek understanding of
combat trauma. Sophocles’ Ajax perhaps provides the best example. It tells the story of a great
and strong warrior, who, losing a friend and feeling betrayed by his superiors, simply snaps.
When he feels the shame for what he has done, he seems to have no choice but to kill himself.
Brian Doerries describes the context of the play in theses terms:
When Achilles died, no one took the news of his loss harder than Ajax. In the days
that followed, Ajax naturally expected to receive Achilles’ armor—one of the
highest combat honors in the Trojan War, as well as a time-honored ritual of
mourning.32
Ajax does not receive the honor as he expects. The ever-sly Odysseus is able to win the contest
for the armor by rigging the rules: the armor will go to the man who can deliver the best speech.
Odysseus, of course, takes the prize. A disgruntled Ajax vows revenge against Odysseus and all
the judges of the funeral games, but most notably Agamemnon and Menelaus. Athena, driving
him mad with blood lust, leads him to butcher and torture a herd of cattle in the place of the
Greek generals. When he learns what he has done, his shame drives him mad and he chooses to
commit suicide.
The play highlights the most important causes, events, and effects of combat trauma, in
such a way that we must conclude that Sophocles, himself a strategos in the Athenian military,
would have been intimate with these psychological phenomena. Among causes of combat
trauma, loss of a friend and experience of war’s horrors can lead to simple trauma.33 Complex
trauma combines the preceding factors with betrayal by a superior officer.34 A military unit
becomes a very close-knit community after years of warfare. Relationships between comrades
become very close, but relationships between inferior and superior officers develop as well.
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These bonds would be all the stronger given that the Greek army units and civil communities
were coextensive, as noted above. Whether philia characterizes those relationships or not, they
provide the ethical justification for a soldier’s actions. He fights because he is ordered to fight,
and he exonerates his part in killing by identifying with the larger command structure and
passing responsibility for his actions up the chain of command.35 When a commander betrays his
subordinate, the whole moral fabric that has been making that soldier’s sacrifices and violence
intelligible comes unraveled, leaving the soldier alone with a tremendous weight of wrath and
guilt.36 Ajax experiences both causes of complex combat trauma: the death of Achilles, his close
friend, and betrayal by his commanders.
Having suffered these standard triggers of combat trauma, Ajax displays the stereotypical
symptoms. The event that often cements combat trauma in our psyche is known as the “berserk
state,” in which a soldier loses rational control and allows wrath and bloodlust to overpower his
reason. In this state, a soldier can be far more deadly and effective, if his lack of calculation does
not get him killed. 37 Shay argues that the human psyche is radically scarred by having even once
entered into this berserk state.38 After a soldier feels the rush of adrenaline, sensation of power,
and release of pent-up anger that characterizes the berserk state, no other experience can provide
the same emotional high in the future. Ajax once again fits the standard perfectly: he has
suffered irreparable harm by losing control of his mind. The effects of combat trauma are also
easy to see in Ajax. His intense shame after the berserk state is a textbook response. Sophocles
followed an old tale in his presentation of Ajax, but given the accuracy with which he portrays
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the now diagnosable berserk state, no doubt he himself saw hoplites suffer what Ajax suffered
and saw them respond similarly.
Lest we consider the story of Ajax too fanciful to relate to the experiences of real Greek
soldiers, it must be noted that such excesses of cruelty and brutality, though perhaps not
common, are far from unknown even in modern battle. Brian Doerries relates the following
incident:
On March 11, 2012, an Army staff sergeant and trained sniper named Robert Bales, a
decorated combat veteran on his fourth deployment in nine years, left his base in
southern Afghanistan under cover of night, walked into a local village, and went
door to door, shooting and stabbing civilians—many of them women and children.
He then returned to base and matter-of-factly told his friend what he had done,
before walking into another village and slaughtering more civilians. Finally, he
walked back to base at dawn, soaked in blood, and reportedly said to fellow soldiers
that he thought he’d done “the right thing.” All told Bales killed sixteen civilians in
two separate attacks, setting many of their bodies ablaze, as boys and girls cowered
behind curtains begging for mercy, screaming, “We are children! We are children!”
In one particularly harrowing detail, a young survivor—a fourteen-year-old boy—
saw Bales enter his family’s shed and open fire on their cow.39
Bales was indeed a modern Ajax, in his strength as a soldier before his fall, and in the brutality
of his fall. Of course his story does not match all of the complexities of the Ajax legend. Of
course, notably absent in our accounts of modern incidents are the gods, who, in Ajax’ case, help
us to exonerate Ajax at least from the baseness of the crime that he commits. In fact, presence of
the gods, both cruel and beautiful, seems to serve a double function in the story: first, their
actions partially relieve the moral weight from Ajax’ crime, second, their beauty elevates a base
story of a soldier-gone-mad to a tale of enough significance to interest celestial beings. Each of
these functions is an integral part of tragedy.
This tragedy, however, bears a deeper relation to combat trauma than the surface-level one
I have identified. Through tragic catharsis, it begins to effect a cure of that trauma. Like most
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tragedies of Sophocles, Ajax tells a tale that makes the ugly beautiful. Ajax is remembered and
defended by his comrades in his death, and even some of his enemies (e.g., Odysseus) remember
justice after all. The tragedy insists that in the final account, Ajax was a noble man. Teucer
defends his character to Agamemnon with these words:
Oh how quickly we forget. Right after a man dies, gratitude instantly evaporates into
a cloud of betrayal. How many times did he put his life on the line for you, shielding
you from the enemy attacks… As the flames spread from ship to ship, mighty Hector
leaped over the hulls and on to your deck with every intention of taking you down.
Tell me! Who saved you that day? Was it some base criminal?40
The tragedy argues that Ajax was not a “base criminal.” Rather, Sophocles emphasizes his
action as one committed because of excessive thumos, in itself a noble quality. 41 In the end, we
exonerate Ajax of base guilt, while still facing the horror of his actions. Without this tragic
outlook, it is easy to dismiss Ajax as a base criminal. Likewise, it would be easy to forgive and
forget the evil of his actions. Both of those approaches are common responses to tragic events in
real life. Shay writes of both reactions to soldiers’ actions in Vietnam. On some occasions,
superior officers sanctioned brutal killings by awarding medals and citations to the perpetrators,
attempting simply to silence the guilty consciences of the men who committed the deeds.42
Some, on the other hand, assume that the sort of men who perpetrate massacres must have been
evil all along.43 Both of these responses, the moralistic and the dismissive, are decidedly
untragic. Only the tragic response allows us to accept both the evil of the action and the nobility
40
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of the man who committed it. Holding the nobility of the man and the baseness of the deed in
this tension allows us to begin to restore the dignity of the man. If he is indeed noble, he has the
capacity to regain that nobility through his response to the baseness of the deed. Through
witnessing the tragic narrative, sympathy with the hero can heal a traumatized mind. If my
claims above about the nature of the tragic mindset are correct, tragedy also bore a deeper
connection to combat trauma through its ability to heal that trauma.
This claim holds true, I will argue, even for tragedies that seem to have little to do with
war on the surface. Although I have thus far examined a tragedy that addresses war directly,
many Greek tragedies preserve the same theme of noble men and women falling into criminal
disaster not by their own evil but because of some hamartia. A full examination of hamartia will
come in my next chapter, but for the moment, we may think of hamartia as a disjunction
between certain aspects of character in protagonists and the circumstances in which the
protagonists finds themselves.44 Thus the Persians meet defeat in Aeschylus’ Persians, Orestes
kills his mother in the Oresteia, Oedipus commits incest, and Electra murders her mother. Each
of the tragedies connects a noble person to disaster by means of a hamartia. Oftentimes the
aspect of character that brings about the hamartia is not a flaw, but is rather indifferent or even
salutary. In Ajax, Ajax’ flaw seems largely to be the collision of his thumetic character and the
unfair circumstances in which he finds himself. Although Antigone rebels excessively against
the political order, we tend to sympathize with her rebellion. In Oedipus Tyrannus, Oedipus’
ruining ‘flaw’ is his desire to understand the plight of the citizens of Thebes: hardly a flaw at
all.45 Of course Oedipus does act with real hubris, but there is nobility in his hubris, when
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contrasted with others that ask him to act ignobly and ignore the plight of the Thebans. It is his
refusal to “live lightly” as Jocasta puts it, that puts him in harm’s way.46
No matter the sort of conflict in which they are engaged, soldiers are shocked out of the
ability to live lightly. Soldiers are faced with the sort of decisions that do not allow for simple,
surface-level thought according to conventional moral categories. Soldiers are also of a
particularly thumetic character – they dare and do great things with great feeling. These
circumstances make the warrior the ideal tragic hero, not simply of tragedies that happen to be
staged on the field of battle, but even those that take place in the city, far from the terror of war.
Not unlike Oedipus’ unrelenting search for truth, soldiers upon their returns often puzzle over
old declassified orders or military reports to find out what exactly they might have done in war.
Sometimes the knowledge they acquire is far more harmful than their previous ignorance. Shay
writes, “returning veterans face a characteristic peril, a risk of dying from the obsession to know
the complete and final truth of what they and the enemy did and suffered in their war and
why.”47 Noble soldiers who have faced conflict, whether they experience trauma or not, are all
tragic heroes because they are faced with Oedipus’ choice: live lightly or suffer. They choose to
suffer. Tragedy’s unique ability to salvage the nobility of the tragic hero would have allowed the
soldiers of the Greek audience to salvage their own nobility and proclaim themselves katharoi;
that is, cleansed, of the guilt of their actions, no matter how horrible those actions were.
We may make this claim with all the more confidence because of the demographics of
the participants in the Dionysia (the Athenians’ greatest tragic festival). As to the participants,
let us begin with the playwrights themselves. Aeschylus was a soldier, and if we may judge by
his funeral epitaph, the proudest achievement of his life was not constant victory at Athens’
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tragic festivals, but his feats on the field of Marathon.48 Sophocles, we know, was elected
strategos or “general” on two occasions, and, in his youth, sang the paean of victory at Salamis.49
Military service was universal for Athenian citizens, so at least a large portion of the audience
would have been made up of ‘active duty’ soldiers. A large portion of the remainder of the
audience would have been made up of combat veterans or future soldiers. The festival began by
the ritual entrance of the god Dionysus into the city, born by ephebes (youths about to enter into
manhood). They had that honor because they had just graduated from Athenian ‘basic training.’50
The theater was split into sections according to demes, which were both units of Athenian social
structure and military units. The fact that the units of social division and military chain of
command were coextensive further emphasizes the saturation of Athenian society with military
life. The basic training graduates of that year (the ephebes) would have had their own seating
section to preserve their military esprit de corps at the tragic festival.51 In the early stages of the
festival, sons whose fathers had died in defense of the polis were paraded in hoplite armor, as
they too were now ready to join the ranks of the ephebes and carry on the proud tradition of their
fathers. Perhaps we may imagine all of these military trappings as reminders of the true bent of
the tragic performances that followed them. In summary of his description of the military
trappings of the City Dionysia, John Winkler writes:
This description may sound more like a West Point graduation ceremony [than our
modern experience of theater], but it is important to remember that the toto caelo
difference which we experience between the military realm and the theatrical,
between marching to war and going to a play, did not apply to the City Dionysia. To
cite a caricature whose degree of truth will later become apparent, Aristophanes
Αἰσχύλον Εὐϕορίωνος Ἀθηναι̑ον τόδε κεύθει/μνη̑μα καταϕθίμενον πυροϕόροιο Γέλας·/ἀλκὴν δ' εὐδόκιμον
Μαραθώνιον ἄλσος ἂν εἴποι/καὶ βαθυχαιτήεις Μη̑δος ἐπιστάμενος. “In Gela, rich in wheat, he died, and lies beneath
this stone:/Aeschylus the Athenian, son of Euphorion./His valour, tried and proved, the mead of Marathon can
tell,/The long-haired Persian also, who knows it all too well.” Greek text and translation from Sommerstein 2010.
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presents Aischylos in the Frogs defending his plays as a form of martial art: his
Seven Against Thebes made every man in the audience lust for battle.52
While lusting for battle may not sound consonant with my theme of combat trauma, let us
remember two points. First, a role of tragedy, as we saw with Ajax, was to declare the veteran
katharos, that is, cleansed of any stain from combat. Such a process of catharsis returns dignity
to war in defense of the polis. Second, we have here an Aristophanean caricature, rather than the
reality. We can imagine that perhaps the “lust for battle” is an exaggeration of the actual feelings
of the audience. We can conclude from Winkler’s analysis of the Dionysia, though, that the
festival was a political and military event as much as it was an artistic one. Or, more accurately,
we could say that such modern distinctions were inoperative: the political, military, and artistic
were united in the Athenian outlook, and, indeed, that Aeschylus and Sophocles personified that
unity.53
Even given the above, to claim that therapy of combat trauma was the explicit and sole
purpose of Attic tragedy would perhaps be naïve. I for one, though I have never tasted battle,
can still experience a measure of catharsis simply in reading a tragedy. We must bear in mind
that our relation to tragedy differs from that of ancient Athenians because we do not experience
the plays in the context of a militaristic festival. We can justly concede, though, that tragedy
treats human trauma, which, at first glance, seems to far exceed combat trauma in its scope. This
concession may seem to undermine the entire purpose of the last twenty pages. Why such
emphasis on war trauma if tragedy treats human trauma in general? We may quiet such a
suspicion in two ways. First the above analysis does reveal that combat trauma was a
particularly salient form of trauma. It was one that not only the tragedies themselves but also
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rituals of the entire City Dionysia sought to address.54 Second, there is that in war and in war
trauma that summarizes and distills human experience like few other situations. J. Glen Gray,
philosopher and veteran of World War II, wrote that those who lived through the experience of
battle “knew a quality of excitement scarcely experienced before or since.” He continues,
Fear may have been the dominant feature of such excitement; rarely was it the only
ingredient. In such an emotional situation there is often a surge of vitality and a
glimpse of potentialities, of what we really are or have been or might become, as
fleeting as it is genuine…Inhuman cruelty can give way to superhuman kindness.
Inhibitions vanish, and people are reduced to their essence…Again and again in
moments of this kind I was as much inspired by the nobility of some of my fellows
as appalled by the animality of others, or, more exactly, by both qualities in the same
person. The average degree, which we commonly know in peacetime, conceals as
much as it reveals about the human creature.55
We have often heard the maxim that war reveals men at their best and worst. Gray takes
the saying a step further: war reveals human beings as human beings. Here we may consider the
aphorism of Herakleitos that “war is father of all and of all things the king: as gods it reveals
some, others as men, as free it makes some, and some as slaves.”56 For Aristotle, war is so
fundamental to human nature that natural human virtues are best described in the context of a
phalanx.57 The uncomfortable truth to which Herakleitos, Aristotle, and Gray attest is that war is
somehow fundamentally bound up in our humanity, or perhaps, humanity is somehow caught up
in war. In short, drawing a distinction between war trauma and ‘human trauma’ seeks to separate
what nature keeps together.
I do not seek, though, to give too privileged a position to combat trauma. An argument
perhaps could be made that every sort of trauma sums up the human condition. I certainly do not
My language remains intentionally vague here. Because the exact way that the tragedies ‘addressed’ trauma is the
argument of my whole paper, it would be premature to provide any formulation that sought greater precision at this
point.
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want to deny the dignity of trauma resulting from domestic violence, sexual assault, or any of the
other host of ways that human beings do violence to their humanity. As Euripides has Dionysus
say in his Bacchae, “the dignity of these humans is to weep.” Weeping and suffering, if accepted
nobly, lends dignity to the sufferer, no matter the cause of that suffering. This paper follows a
certain strain of human suffering through Attic tragedy.58 In the course of this paper, it will
become clear that following this particular strain of suffering allows us to see certain elements of
tragedy very clearly. The previous analysis of the fundamental status of war in classical culture
generally and in the Athenian tragic festivals in particular lends credibility to this approach. No
ancient source allows us to address the fundamental aspects of tragedy better than Aristotle’s
Poetics, where Aristotle presents an analysis of tragedy in detail, putting catharsis, the cleansing
of disorders in the soul, at its center. Turning first to that source and then to the broader
Aristotelian corpus, I will argue that catharsis can be understood as treatment of psychological
trauma. By the end of my thesis, I will present a theory as to how this catharsis functioned in
Attic tragedy.

Aristotle’s Poetics

58

Other types of trauma or emotional pain could be followed. Doerries (2015b), for example, makes a compelling
case that Prometheus Bound was intended to address the suffering of prisoners. Combat, though, seems to be the
most prevalent source of trauma in tragedy.

29
Among the ancient sources, Aristotle’s Poetics provides us with the most complete
account of the nature and effects of tragedy.59 Thus, it will be necessary to provide a summary
account of the Poetics in order to guide a final interpretation of catharsis based in the relation
between tragedy and trauma discussed above. This chapter analyzes key terms in the Poetics
such as mimesis, muthos, hamartia, peripateia, and anagnorisis in order to analyze the internal
workings of a tragedy out of which catharsis arises. After analyzing these parts of tragedy in
turn, the final argument of the chapter establishes that, according to Aristotle, catharsis is the end
of tragedy.
Aristotle begins his work addressing the most basic aspect of the issue at hand: the nature
of art. In the most general terms, Aristotle describes art as a techne – a craft or skill. It surpasses
the particular nature of experience, and is based on knowledge of the causes that make the techne
cause the desired outcome.60 Thus it treats reality in such a way as to reflect it as an object of
knowledge, formed of knowable causes and effects, rather than as an episodic sequence of
unconnected things. In short, it treats the world as if made of discernable wholes, rather than
mere heaps of things.61
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Before I begin my analysis of the work, I must note one preliminary point. It is possible to become caught up in a
question as to whether the Poetics is a prescriptive or descriptive work; that is, whether it is a manual for tragedies
or simply a summary of the way tragedies happen to be written. If taken as pure description, it would seem
inadequate at times, and if as prescriptive, it would lack any substantive relation to the tragic corpus, except in
accidental cases when Sophocles’ dramas happened to match Aristotle’s guidelines. My understanding is that it
does a little bit of both: its analysis does not perfectly match every tragedy in the corpus, but it does reveal important
characteristics about the underlying structure and the purpose of tragedy that are not only prescriptive, but can also
be found in the tragic corpus. Ultimately, as the analysis in my chapter will reveal, I treat the Poetics as a
philosophical text. Like much of Aristotle’s philosophy, I believe it begins with an honest apprehension of the
relevant phenomena. Thus, although it distills the essence of tragedy in such a way that certain extant tragedies
seem to fall outside its description, as a general rule, it will provide a fruitful interpretive lens for tragedy as it was
practiced in fifth century Athens. Carnes Lord concurs on this point (1982:173). While a thorough defense of this
position is not practicable in this thesis, charitable readers will accept this assumption for the sake of argument, and
if they find that my argument reveals worthy fruits, will perhaps be willing to trust the validity of my assumption.
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For the complete classification of the several types of knowing, see Metaphysics Book I. For techne, see 981a-b.
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Not all things are equally objects of knowledge. Plato famously presented a divided line, above it things are
knowable, below it, things are not similarly knowable. Aristotle, of course, differs from this interpretation, but for
him as for Plato, certain things are more knowable than others. Only things that occur in such a way that they are
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For Aristotle, techne refers primarily to the craft that produces a thing, although, as in the
English word “art” or “craft” it can refer to both the faculty of producing and the production
itself. Nevertheless, the focus of the Poetics is on the faculty of producing, the poetry that is
produced, and that poetry’s effect on its audience. Hence Aristotle’s concept of art is primarily
dynamic.62 As a techne, poetry is as much the inspiration, writing, and reception of the poem as
it is the words of the poem itself.
Rather than dividing arts into ‘fine arts’ and ‘crafts’ or ‘skills’ as is done in modern
times, Aristotle separates the arts into essentially two categories; imitative and non-imitative
arts.63 Imitation may be the best translation among English alternatives for the meaning-laden
Greek term mimesis, but it remains impoverished of that word’s rich and ambiguous
connotations. The disparity in meaning is best demonstrated by Aristotle’s claim that music is
the most mimetic of all the arts. (Aristotle Poetics 1447a14) Clearly music, barring some
exceptions, cannot simply imitate natural sounds. Beethoven’s Eroica may not imitate the visual
or auditory perception of a hero, but the entire piece, in Aristotle’s view, must somehow imitate
what it is to be heroic. If mimesis were pure imitation, then realistic visual arts, not music, would
be the most perfectly mimetic art: it captures things ‘as they are.’ Mimesis must supersede basic
copying of material things. Perhaps re-presentation is a better translation: Aristotle’s notion of
mimesis implies that the object of the mimesis is presented again to the audience for their
edification or enjoyment.
In order to establish what Aristotle might mean by his claims about mimesis, it is
necessary to pay closer attention to the text of the Poetics itself. Near the very opening of the

necessary or probable can be really known, thus “poetry is more philosophical than history” because, like
philosophy, it deals with discreet entities. Philosophy speaks of substances, poetry of actions. See Poetics 1450b30.
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work, Aristotle establishes the importance of mimesis to the entirety of the work. He claims,
“epic poetry, poetry of tragedy, so also comedy, dithyrambic poetry, and most of flute-playing
and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, mimesis.” (Poetics 1447a14)64 Aristotle goes on to
imply, naturally, that painters are also practitioners of imitative art. (Aristotle Poetics 1447a19)
His treatment of painting is brief; perhaps in painting the meaning of mimesis is too obscured by
that art’s close visual relationship to particular material things. He primarily addresses a
different means of imitation: rhythm, language, and harmony. He writes, “such harmony
together with rhythm alone work out (mimesis) in flute-playing and lyre-playing...”65 (Aristotle
Poetics 1447a26)66 Two things can be established about the nature of mimesis from this passage:
mimesis can represent particular actions or objects by mere copying, but it also carries a deeper
sense that goes beyond mere copying.
Aristotle states explicitly in the next section of the Poetics that mimesis does not mean
simply imitation of objects as they appear:
ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ
φαύλους εἶναι… ἤτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὥσπερ οἱ
γραφεῖς... καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ κιθαρίσει ἔστι γενέσθαι ταύτας τὰς
ἀνομοιότητας… (Aristotle, Poetics 1448a8-12)
Since then the men represented are represented acting, it is necessary that these are
either earnest or base…being written as either better, worse, or just the same as
us…and even in dancing and aulus-playing and lyre playing it is possible that these
irregularities happen.67
Referring to poetry and prose here, Aristotle indicates that all mimetic art does not simply show
the appearances of things, as noted above. It not only imitates but also creates; hence, the word
that once referred to all creative art and forms the root of our work for poetry (ποιήσις) stems
ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἔτι δὲ κωμῳδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη
καὶ κιθαριστικῆς πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον Tr. Eddie Hoffmann. Unless otherwise noted, all
translations are from Richard McKeon’s The Complete Works of Aristotle (McKeon 1941) The Greek text of
Aristotle’s Poetics, unless otherwise noted, comes from Aristotle’s Ars Poetica (R. Kassel 1966)
65
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οἷον ἁρμονίᾳ μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῷ χρώμεναι μόνον ἥ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ…
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from the verb “to make” (ποιέω). By the act of making, the poet is imitating something in nature.
In the Physics, Aristotle writes of techne in general:
τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος, ὥσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ [30] τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν
μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἔνθυμον καὶ διανοητικόν ἐστιν: διόπερ ἐλεύθερόν τε διατελεῖ καὶ
βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας.68
(Aristotle Physics 199a10-15)
“if things made by nature were made also by art, they would come to be in the same
way as by nature. Each step then in the series is for the sake of the next; and
generally art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly
imitates her.”
An imitation (mimesis) is thus a making (poiesis) that both re-presents and improves upon events
in nature. The mimesis improves upon nature because it can present the natural thing to us more
clearly than it appears in nature. It does this through the clarity with which a mimesis can
represent the formal structure of a thing, so that it can be an object of knowledge. This, once
again, is why poetry is more philosophical than history, for Aristotle: history, the investigation of
events as they happen in nature, can be improved upon by re-presenting those events through
poiesis. In so doing, poetry can speak more generally than history, which gets caught up too
narrowly, in Aristotle’s account, in specific events.
Poetry accomplishes this task through the muthos, or the plot. The essence of poetry,
Aristotle writes, is the plot. Characters and language can enhance the force of the plot, but the
plot remains at the center of a work. The plot remains central: “it is set down by us that tragedy
is a mimesis of a whole and completed action having a certain magnitude…” (Aristotle Poetics
1450b24)69 The plot’s beginning, middle, and end give the act form and shape; they define the
shape (μόρφη) and “look” (εἴδος) of the story.70 Here re-presentation improves upon nature: we
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Greek text of the Physics from Aristotelis Physica (Ross 1950). Tr. McKeon 1941.
κεῖται δὴ ἡμῖν τὴν τραγῳδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μίμησιν ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος:
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cannot see the beginnings, middles, and endings of actions in the real world.71 This is especially
true in those actions most intimate to us: while living our life, we will never see its end, we
cannot remember its beginning, and hence, we cannot discover its middle. One can only see
those formal structures in a human life, if they exist, from the outside. Aristotle writes:
ὅλον δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ
ἀνάγκης μετ᾽ ἄλλο ἐστίν, μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι: τελευτὴ δὲ
τοὐναντίον ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μετ᾽ ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ [30] ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ,
μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν: μέσον δὲ ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ᾽ ἄλλο καὶ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον. δεῖ
ἄρα τοὺς συνεστῶτας εὖ μύθους μήθ᾽ ὁπόθεν ἔτυχεν ἄρχεσθαι μήθ᾽ ὅπου ἔτυχε
τελευτᾶν, ἀλλὰ κεχρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἰδέαις. (Aristotle, Poetics 1450b25-35)
But a whole is a thing having a beginning, and a middle, and an end. A beginning is
what is itself not from necessity after another thing, and after that another thing by
nature is or comes to be. But an end, oppositely, is what by nature itself comes to be
after another thing, from necessity or in the most part, after this is no other thing.
But a middle is what both after another thing and another is after it. It is necessary
that plots standing together well neither happen to begin after something nor happen
to end wherever, but to use the aforesaid ideas.72
This laborious description of the trajectory of the plot is necessary precisely because events in
history have no clear beginnings, middles, or ends. They form part of a long and oftentimes
indiscernible string of causes and human actors that we cannot make out. Poetry is both a poiesis
and a mimesis precisely because it creatively imposes formal structures on individual events (by
means of the plot) where nature may not have placed them. Aristotle also emphasizes the proper
length of a plot, writing, “and indeed it is necessary to have a limit on the plot, and that this is
easily remembered.” (Poetics 1451a5)73 This allows the entire plot to be viewed by the limited
human memory as a single entity with a single aspect.

One need only read Herodotus’ Histories to acquiesce that a historian has a difficult time establishing the event
that forms the beginning, middle, and end of his story. To find a beginning of a relatively brief conflict between
Persia and Greece, Herodotus reaches back to the mythic past. One could well argue that his story has no end, but
that the events he describes naturally lead to the Peloponnesian War, which causes further upheavals, etc. History
gives us no neat beginnings, middles, or endings.
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Moreover, the plot is not some arbitrary compilation of events, nor does it take its
boundary from one period of time, or from the deeds of one man. The plot sums up a single
action (πράξις in the Greek). This action is unified by necessity or probability. Aristotle sums up
his teaching by saying, “But it is clear from what was said that the work of a poet is not to speak
of not the things having happened, but the sort of things which might happen and the things able
to happen according to seeming or necessity.” (Poetics 1451a38)74 Of plots, Aristotle writes, the
worst are those that establish no necessary connection between things. He claims, “of simple
plots and actions the episodic are the worst. I say that a plot is episodic in which the episodes are
after one another neither in seeming nor by necessity.” (Poetics 1451b34)75 In other words, the
plot must form a unity: a whole, rather than a heap.
To summarize, as a mimeis the plot (muthos) re-presents the action (praxis). It is the
intelligible element of the story that renders it as a whole. Aristotle makes this argument clear in
his treatment of tragedy. Aristotle writes that “For tragedy is a mimesis not of men but of actions
and of life. Happiness and misery is in action; and the end is a certain action, not a quality.”
(Poetics 1450a15)76 Poetry is an imitation in words of the actions that form the ends of life. It
does imitate characters and things, but these appear in tragedy primarily for the sake of the plot
and action (muthos and praxis) and are incidental rather than essential to the story. Aristotle
insists that “is an imitation of action, and mostly on account of it (action), of the men acting.”
(Poetics 1450b3) 77 Other elements of the story are even less essential. Thought and diction are

φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο
καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Tr. Eddie Hoffmann
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μετ᾽ ἄλληλα οὔτ᾽ εἰκὸς οὔτ᾽ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. Tr. Eddie Hoffmann
76
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also not as central to a story as plot; spectacle is least essential of all. (Poetics 1450b) The details
of the story happen as a result of causes; Aristotle inists:
ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου, ὥστε ἐκ τῶν
προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα: διαφέρει
γὰρ πολὺ τὸ γίγνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἢ μετὰ τάδε. (Aristotle Poetics 1452a18-21)
“it is necessary that these things come to be from the standing-together of the plot,
such that these things happen to throw together from the things having been brought
into being either from necessity or according to seeming: for it differs greatly, what
things are on account of these things and the things after these things.”78
That the poem is connected by causes that lead it from a definite beginning to a definite ending
ensures that it re-presents one discreet action in full.
Tragedy does not imitate an action by description of that particular action, rather it
imitates the action by re-presentation of the same kind of action. Silvia Carli writes that in
Aristotle’s view, “like the lover of wisdom, the maker of plots has the capacity to see the
determinate formal structures that make our world and its transformations intelligible.”79
Aristotle writes that poetry speaks in universal statements “But it is according to the whole, by
which I mean what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do—which is
the aim of poetry, though it fixes proper names to the characters…” (Poetics 1451b7-8) 80
Aristotle regards history, which he opposes to poetry, not as recording broad themes and causes
in the succession of events of the world, but an investigation of all of the things that happened in
a particular time, or a particular place, or to a particular man. All of these things form the worst
sort of plots and it is in contrast with these qualities that Aristotle says that poetry is more
philosophical than history. Re-presenting human action by poetic mimesis has the effect of
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forming a mental grasp of an event in the mind such that there is a singular aspect of the event.
Silvia Carli describes Aristotle’s position in these terms:
Poetry…depicts a fully determined object, that is to say, an action, which is a whole
with a beginning, a middle and an end, because mimesis is a representation not of
human events, but rather their nature (physis), understood as form (eidos), and that for
the sake of which (to hou katholou.)81
Mimetic poiesis takes an event, shears the non-essentials from it, and presents it to the mind in a
clarified form. Thus Aeschylus’ Persians portrays the hubris of Xerxes and all of the Persian
Wars in one grand plot; but it also presents all hubristic actions of the same sort. Aristotle makes
clear that historical actions, like Xerxes’ invasion of Greece, can be fit to be re-presented as
unities. Tragedy, he writes, can be written about historical events, that which has happened is
manifestly possible….” (Poetics 1452a8) “In short, poetry imitates reality. It can give a clearer
vision of an event than experience of the event itself might perhaps have given by presenting the
bare essence of the event, either with the same incidental qualities or others attached to the plot.
There are two valid types of plots for Aristotle: the simple and the complex. Aristotle
writes,
εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἁπλοῖ οἱ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι: καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις ὧν μιμήσεις...
λέγω δὲ ἁπλῆν μὲν πρᾶξιν ἧς γινομένης ὥσπερ ὥρισται συνεχοῦς καὶ μιᾶς ἄνευ
περιπετείας ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἡ μετάβασις γίνεται, πεπλεγμένην δὲ ἐξ ἧς μετὰ
ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ περιπετείας ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἡ μετάβασίς ἐστιν. (Aristotle Poetics
1452a15-20)
Of plots, there are, on the one hand, the simple, and on the other, the complex. I call
the action preceding in the way defined simple as one continuous whole, when the
change in the hero’s fortunes takes place without peripateia or anagnorisis; and
complex, when it involves one or the other, or both.82
Here Aristotle gives us two of the plot’s elements: peripateia and anagnorisis. These elements
are in turn shaped by the harmartia. If the plot is simple, the action of the whole plot is simply
driven by hamartia. What then is hamartia? This in itself is a question of some debate.
81
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Literally, the word should be translated as “a missing of the mark.” A long-prevailing view held
that hamartia could simply be translated as “sin” (as it is in the New Testament). This view
would make the tragic action of Greek drama driven by just punishment for violation of moral
law.83 While a case could be made that offense against the gods is a common theme of Attic
tragedy, the notion of moral law, so prevalent in our own culture, is an inheritance we derive
from Jerusalem rather than Athens. 84 Most scholarship now takes hamartia to mean error in
judgment.85 According to this view, the tragic hero makes an error in judgment that causes his
fortunes to change, (peripateia) and the tragedy is complete in his recognition of that change.
This very standard interpretation, however, robs the Poetics of any real depth or richness.86
When we place a tragic hero in the center of the drama, hamartia simply cannot mean a mistake
of fact if we are to preserve any depth or richness of meaning in tragedy. It is then necessary to
turn to the larger events of the plot to provide a means to avoid these unacceptable alternatives.
The change of fortunes, at first glance, seems a simpler nut to crack. A tragic hero
experiences a change in fortunes, the recognition of which causes him insurmountable tragedy.
As we saw above, however, this change of fortunes, if driven by hamartia in the tragic hero,
forces us either to interpret hamartia as sin, or to interpret it as mistake of fact. The first
interpretation seems to reduce tragedy to trite moral fairy-tales, the second to sadistically
humorous stories of mistaken judgment. Both alternatives, needless to say, are unacceptable,
and do not, as we shall see, match a careful reading of Oedipus, which I shall choose to analyze
following Aristotle’s example. John Jones answers this problem by an unconventional choice:
For a very careful analysis and rejection of this interpretation, see Nancy Sherman “Hamartia and Virtue” in A.O.
Rorty’s Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics pp. 177-196.
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water. The man is consumed in flames. His hamartia or error of judgment caused a change in our hero’s fortunes.
This is not the stuff of tragoedia.
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against the tradition of interpretation, he chooses to claim that there is no tragic hero in
Aristotelian drama, and that the change in fortunes are therefore not a change in the fortunes of a
single man, but simply in the nature of the situation in which the tragedy occurs. This change in
fortunes happens to foul the life of a man who happens to be the center of the tragedy. Jones
very accurately points to the fact that oftentimes, hamartia simply cannot be found in the tragic
hero of actual Greek drama.
The same hero who has been imposed on the Poetics is looked for in the plays
themselves, and he is found there of course: and sometimes, by a nice irony,
Aristotle incurs blame for failing to fit his theory to the dramatic facts. Antigone,
pace Hegel, is innocent (the commentators protest) of hamartia. Oedipus’s hamartia
does not cause his downfall. Philoctetes does not fall, he rises.87
Jones uses his quite logical sequence of argumentation to reject utterly the notion of the tragic
hero. Though I respect the validity of his argument, even a cursory examination of the Poetics,
in my estimation, contradicts his conclusion.
When analyzing the plot, Aristotle focuses it on the fortunes of a single character.88
Aristotle writes:
ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα τούτων λοιπός. ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ
δικαιοσύνῃ μήτε διὰ κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν μεταβάλλων εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἀλλὰ δι᾽
ἁμαρτίαν τινά, τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ…ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν καλῶς
ἔχοντα μῦθον ἁπλοῦν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ διπλοῦν, ὥσπερ τινές φασι, καὶ μεταβάλλειν
οὐκ εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μὴ διὰ
μοχθηρίαν ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἁμαρτίαν μεγάλην ἢ οἵου εἴρηται ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ
χείρονος. (Aristotle, Poetics, 1453a6-18)
There remains then, the intermediate kind of personage, a man not preeminently
virtuous and just, whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him not by vice and
depravity but by some error of judgment (hamartia)…the change in the hero’s
fortunes must not be from misery to happiness…and the cause of it must lie not in
any depravity, but in some great error (hamartia) on his part, the man being either
such as we have described, or better, not worse, than that.
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Though, as Jones correctly notes, the word “hero” appears nowhere in the Poetics, what does
indeed appear is a man whose action is the action of the drama.89 There is no room for a
rejection of the tragic hero in the Poetics. Aristotle goes on to write:
ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολὴ καθάπερ
εἴρηται, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὥσπερ λέγομεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον ἐν τῴ̂ Οἰδιποδι
ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐφρανῶν τὸν Οἰδίπουν καὶ ἀπαλλάξων τοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φόβου,
δηλώσας ὃς ἦν, τοὐναντίον ἐποίησεν: (Aristotle Poetics 1452a20-25)
A peripety (peripateia) is the change of the kind described from one state of things
within the play to its opposite, and that too in the way we are saying, in the probable
or necessary sequence of events; as it is for instance in Oedipus: here the opposite
state of things is produced by the messenger, who, coming to gladden Oedipus and to
remove his fears as to his mother, reveals the secret of his birth.
The change of fortunes in Oedipus, to use Aristotle’s example, is precisely a change in Oedipus’
fortunes. The surrounding circumstances have not changed at all; in Oedipus, the peripateia is a
subjective one; it is a peripateia bound up with anagnorisis (Aristotle Poetics 1452a20). There is
a single man whose action forms the action of the drama. Gerald Else concurs with my analysis:
Confusion on this point has been at the root of many misunderstandings of Aristotle.
It has misled John Jones, for example, to the absurd statement that there is no such
thing as the tragic hero in the Poetics. What Jones means here is something quite
different: there is no intimate, inward personality of modern type at the core of
Aristotle’s ethos.90
This however, is not precisely what Jones argues. Else captures one element of Jones’s
argument: his critique of the modern notion of character anachronistically applied to Sophoclean
characters, but he dismisses a real problem that arises with present misunderstandings of
hamartia and peripateia and locates those problems in the problem of character, separated from
While Aristotle does not use the words “tragic hero,” he describes a man of a certain character whose fall from
good to bad fortune forms the center of the action of the plot. Without venturing an educated opinion on the exact
role of the tragic hero in the Poetics or in the tragic corpus, I use the term as shorthand for Aristotle’s phrase (man of
an intermediate character, or slightly better than the average; see the quotation above) in the simplest way possible.
For the purposes of my argument, the tragic hero is simply the protagonist of a tragedy. I follow Aristotle in placing
more emphasis on analysis of the plot and action rather than the characters involved. For a treatment of the tragic
hero most consonant with my own understanding of him, see Lord 1982:165-173. Although I differ with Else on
other points, his discussion of the tragic hero agrees with my analysis as well (Else 1986:166 and following).
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those other issues. Rather than thus dodging the issue, we ought to take Jones’ very good (though
mistaken) argument at what it is worth: the interpretation of peripateia as a ruining change in the
hero’s fortunes as a result of his own mistake of fact results in a quite shallow theory of poetry,
one we would hardly expect from Aristotle. If we accept the validity of the argument but reject
the truth of the conclusion, there must be some error in the premises. Clearly what is necessary
is not another dodging of the issue but a new theory of hamartia, one that preserves the tragic
hero, but does not make tragedy a shallow and trite affair.
Unfortunately, we shall have to approach this new understanding of hamartia in a
roundabout way (one may almost say that my argument will use peripateia) by means of a
discussion of anagnorisis. Aristotle defines anagnorisis as broadly as possible. It is simply “a
change from ignorance to knowledge, and thus to either love or hate, in the personages marked
for good or evil fortune.” (Aristotle, Poetics, 1452a30)91 Aristotle uses several simple
discoveries as examples. “The discovery, then, being of persons, it may be of one party only to
the other, the latter being already known; or both the parties may have to discover themselves.”
(Aristotle Poetics 1452b5)92 Here, Aristotle cites the simple anagnorisis of Orestes and Iphigenia
in Iphigenia. However, these simpler and specific examples should not detract from the earlier
general definition that allows anagnorisis to be any coming to knowledge from ignorance.
Aristotle writes, “The finest form of discovery is one attended by peripeties, like that in
Oedipus.” This form of anagnorisis is “most directly connected with the plot and the action of
the piece…” (Aristotle Poetics 1452a30)93
ἀναγνώρισις δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὔνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, τῶν
πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὡρισμένων:
92
ἐπεὶ δὴ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις τινῶν ἐστιν ἀναγνώρισις, αἱ μέν εἰσι θατέρου πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον μόνον, ὅταν ᾖ δῆλος ἅτερος
τίς ἐστιν, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀμφοτέρους δεῖ ἀναγνωρίσαι
93
καλλίστη δὲ ἀναγνώρισις, ὅταν ἅμα περιπετείᾳ γένηται, οἷον ἔχει ἡ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι. εἰσὶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι
ἀναγνωρίσεις: καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει καὶ εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν
ἔστιν ἀναγνωρίσαι.
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In each of these cases, Aristotle uses quite obvious examples to explain what he means by
anagnorisis. On the other hand, however, we must not limit ourselves to his simpler examples,
given the definition he lists above that is far broader; simply coming to a knowledge that one did
not before possess.
I therefore make the case that there can be a deeper sort of anagnorisis than the simple
discovery of fact. Let us take Oedipus’ anagnorisis as our starting point. Without providing a
complete interpretation of the play, we can still make some claims regarding anagnorisis that
would hold true in nearly any reading of the work. Oedipus, of course, discovers that the man he
had killed at the crossroads was his father. He also discovered that the woman by whom he had
fathered Eteocles, Polynices, Antigone, and Ismene was his mother. However, he discovers
something deeper as well. Consider what he says to Tiresias:
Yet solving the riddle then was a prophet’s task, and plainly you had no such gift of
prophecy from birds nor otherwise from any god to glean a word of knowledge. But
I came, Oedipus, who know nothing, and I stopped her. I solved the riddle by my
wit alone.94
The gist of Oedipus’ position is that his wit, his knowledge, is enough to solve his problems, and
so far, his statement holds true: Oedipus has saved himself and Thebes by his cleverness alone.
As he says later:
Ah! Ah! O dear Jocasta, why should one look to the Pythian hearth? Why should one
look to the birds screaming overhead? They prophesied that I should kill my father!
But he’s dead…and I stand here who never laid a hand on spear against him…95
When all has come to fulfillment, Oedipus realizes his mistake about the gods: “It was Apollo,
friends, Apollo, that brought this bitter bitterness, my sorrows to completion.”96 Oedipus learns
whom he killed at the crossroads and with whom he lay in the chamber of Laius, no doubt, but
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he learns something more terrible indeed, as Jocasta feared: “O Oedipus, god help you! God
keep you from the knowledge of who you are!”97 Indeed, it was this anagnorisis that undid him.
Tiresias saw this from the beginning:
Oedipus: “How needlessly your riddles darken everything.”
Teiresias: “But aren’t you best at answering riddles.”
Oedipus: “Yes. Taunt me where you will find me great.”
Teiresias: “It is this very luck that has destroyed you.”98
Why was Oedipus destroyed, according to Teiresias? He learned who he was. Teiresias hints
that he learned that terrible knowledge twice: he learned what human being was, while facing the
sphinx, and he learned again who he was, when he solved the riddle of his birth. Clearly, there
are several levels of anagnorisis here: the shallow discoveries (that Oedipus is the son of Laius,
Oedipus killed Laius at the crossroads, Oedipus had fathered children with his own mother
Jocasta, etc.), and the deeper discoveries (about the brokenness, incompleteness, and mortality
that is part of human nature, about human reliance on seemingly spiteful gods, etc.).
Oedipus’ coming to knowledge from ignorance, his anagnorisis, is what ruins him. His
spirited nature, that demands to know, is his only fault. He seeks to know not only for his own
sake, but for the sake of Thebes. It is his very nobility that leads him astray.
Oedipus: “You’d rob us of this your gift of prophecy? You talk as one who had no
care for law nor love for Thebes who reared you.”
Teiresias: “Yes, but I see that even your own words miss the mark (hamartanousi);
therefore I must fear for mine.
Oedipus: “For god’s sake if you know of anything, do not turn from us; all of us
kneel to you, all of us here, your suppliants.”
Teiresias: “All of you here know nothing. I will not bring to the light of day my
troubles, mine—rather than call them yours.”99
Oedipus’ thumetic character, devoted as he is to his task of governing Thebes well, leads him to
desire more knowledge than is good.100 His hamartia is that desire for wisdom, born from his
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thumetic character. And so we return to the question of hamartia: Oedipus’ mistakes of
judgment were not the faults that undid him. His noble and thumetic character, run afoul of his
imperfect circumstances, was his ruin. It is important to remember that Oedipus fits Aristotle’s
criteria for the tragic hero: he is not a bad man, deserving the punishment he receives, rather he is
like us, of an “intermediate” character; in fact, he is more noble than most. One can imagine
most political leaders of lesser character heeding the warnings of Jocasta to take the ignoble and
easy path and leave off inquiry. Oedipus’ very nobility made the curse of Apollo follow him all
along. Even more, his discoveries about the world ruined him. 101 Sophocles’ drama is drawing
us to reflect not on how minor character flaws ruin good men but how the idiosyncrasies of
certain generally good moral characters can lead to tragedy in imperfect circumstances. It also
demonstrates how men can retain their nobility even in the midst of great suffering. And thus, the
hamartia that changes Oedipus’ fortunes is not so much in Oedipus as in the relation between
Oedipus’ broken character and the brokenness of the world. A literal translation of hamartia
implies this relational aspect: hamartia means “a missing of the mark,” or a disjunction between
two things. An arrow may miss the mark for any number of reasons beyond a flaw in its
balance. Just so, the hero of a drama may find himself in error (hamartia) not by some fault in
his own character or judgment, but in the myriad imperfections by which he is surrounded.
Let us take stock of the state of our argument thus far. A tragedy has a plot that represents an action as if it had determinate formal structures and a beginning, a middle, and an
end (which of course, actions in the real world hardly ever do). It presents a story of a man of
slightly better character than the average falling from good fortune to ill. The best of these
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tragedies bring about this fall by means of anagnorisis attended by peripateia; that is, the tragic
hero (shorthand for a man of the character before listed) falls into misfortune by his discoveries,
or at least his discoveries and his fall are attendant upon each other. The peripateia is driven by
the tragic hero’s hamartia, the disjunction between his own character and the rift in the nature of
things that he discovers.
The preceding interpretation of the Poetics has revealed the internal components of a
good tragedy.102 But one question remains for this all too brief treatment of the Poetics to be
complete, at least for the current moment: what effect does that tragedy have on its audience?
Aristotle gives two answers catharsis, and the tragic pleasure. It is our task to determine how
closely these two effects are related and which, if either, is the end of tragedy.
I will address the tragic pleasure first. Aristotle notes that tragedy must arouse pity and
fear, and that this pity may come from several sources. Spectacle may arouse pity and fear, of
course, but the best dramatist, Aristotle writes, relies on the structure and events of the plot to
arouse these emotions.
τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν.
οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ [9] φοβερὸν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατῶδες μόνον [10]
παρασκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τραγῳδίᾳ κοινωνοῦσιν: οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν
ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ
ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητήν, φανερὸν ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν
ἐμποιητέον. (Aristotle Poetics 1453b9-14)
Those, however, who make use of the spectacle to put before us that which is mere
monstrous and not productive of fear, are wholly out of touch with tragedy; not every
kind of pleasure should be required of a tragedy, but only its own proper pleasure.
The tragic pleasure is that of pity and fear, and the poet has to produce it by a work
of imitation; it is clear, therefore, that the causes should be included in the incidents
of his story.
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The tragic pleasure is a pleasure of pity and fear. It is, in short, our ability to feel pity and fear in
a pleasurable way. Aristotle notes that the pleasure is by the imitation, and that the causes of the
events in the story contribute to that pleasure. A second source of the tragic pleasure, then, is the
ability to behold pitiable and fearful events and understand why they happened and how they
ended. The beauty of a tragedy, Aristotle writes, is that it is of such magnitude that it can be
comprehended at a glance, and that it has a necessary or natural beginning, middle, and end.
(Aristotle Poetics 1450b20-35) Seeing the formal structures of an event gives us a pleasure of
comprehending the event. Although one could potentially see pleasure as the end of poetry,
Aristotle nowhere makes this claim. Else argues that the tragic pleasure, not catharsis, is the end
of tragedy. This point is addressed more fully in the following chapter by analysis of the
Politics. However, a brief note on Else’s reading of the Poetics is necessary here. He translates
eleou kai phobou (ἔλεου καὶ φόβου) as “the pitiful and fearful event” of tragedy, and toiauta tα
pathematα (τοιαύτα τὰ παθήματα) as “such like passionate events.”103 In the course of these
events, the tragic hero is declared katharos. That, according to Else, is catharsis, and for him, it
is primarily internal to the tragedy, rather than primarily an effect on the audience. Such a
convoluted translation standing against the interpretive tradition and the clear and primary
meaning of Aristotle’s text is itself unjustified, even without the further testimony of the
Politics.104 Nowhere does Aristotle speak of the pleasure as the end or final cause of tragedy.
Our second alternative, catharsis, remains an ambiguous concept. Literally it means
“purification,” but how and for whom that purification occurs is a complex question. Aristotle
speaks of a catharsis of pity, fear, and other such like emotions (toiauta ta pathemaτα). Without
venturing into the complex questions of what catharsis is or how it might have worked (such
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questions are the subjects of chapters III and IV, respectively) we can at least claim one thing
about catharsis with relative assurance: namely, that it is the end of tragedy. Aristotle quite
clearly lists catharsis as the final cause in his definition of tragedy:
ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας [25] καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης,
ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι᾽
ἀπαγγελίας, δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων
κάθαρσιν. (Aristotle Poetics 1449b24-28)
A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having
magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind
brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form;
with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such
emotions.
The events re-presented in tragedy are shown in such a way as to arouse pity and fear and to
“catharse” “such emotions” through that pity and fear.105 Perhaps the best way to approach the
nature of catharsis, given its brief treatment in the Poetics, is obliquely. If catharsis is the end of
tragedy, an examination of the end of tragedy as Aristotle discusses it elsewhere will at least test
that claim, and likely lead us to the nature of catharsis.

Chapter III: The Politics of Tragedy
That the cathartic end of tragedy occurred in the setting of a political community is a
known historical fact. But that this catharsis was in itself politically oriented is another claim
entirely. It is one, however, that is borne up by Aristotle’s own statement on the subject. Thus,
this chapter will approach catharsis from a political standpoint. First, I will examine Aristotle’s
remarks on the political nature of tragedy from the Politics. Turning from the Politics to the
Poetics, I will examine more closely what the political function of tragedy was from this
I invent the verb “catharse.” At this point a representing the process of catharsis with any English verb would
serve to conceal more than it would reveal.
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standpoint, concluding that tragedy’s political purpose is therapy of damaged thumoi among the
citizens. Having done so, I will turn to the nature of thumos that tragedy addresses and analyze
its place in Aristotle’s view of action and responsibility. I will demonstrate that thumos fits
perfectly into the nexus of hamartia, peripateia, and anagnorisis found in the muthos of a
tragedy. I conclude that catharsis served the political purpose of thumetic therapy for Athenian
citizen-soldiers.
Before I proceed with my analysis, however, it is perhaps best to address two preliminary
points. First, throughout my paper, I have referred to the Greek notion of spiritedness, or
thumos. In this chapter, that aspect of the soul will take prominence. For Aristotle, it comes in
the part of the soul that is not in itself reasoning, but may serve reason. Carnes Lord describes
this part of the soul as follows: “that part of the soul which is capable of obeying reason without
itself being reasonable is elsewhere called by the Aristotle the ‘desiring’ (epithumetikon) or the
passionate (pathetikon, orektikon) part of the soul.”106 As Aristotle’s varying terms in the
quotation above indicate, there is wide variety of emotions and faculties in this part of the soul.
Aristotle distinguishes in the Nichomachean Ethics (1149a25-b8) between a portion of this part
of the soul that acts out of desire (this part we may infer is epithumetikon) and a part that acts out
of passion or emotion (which we may infer is pathetikon). Here, thumos forms part of the
passionate, emotional part of the soul. Though Plato divides the soul at large differently, with
Lord, we can read their understandings of thumos together. In reference to the emotions proper
to tragedy, Lord writes,
Aristotle could mean that class of passions which is associated with the experience of
‘pain’ rather than of pleasure or desire, passions which have their locus in what Plato
had identified as the “spirited” (thumetikon) part of the soul…Though thumos
frequently carries the simple meaning of ‘anger,’ it encompasses a range of passions
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bearing on men’s social and political relationships—moral indignation, friendship,
the desire for honor and superiority.107
We may follow Lord in distinguishing thumos from other functions of the non-rational part of
the soul in two ways. First, thumos seems in general be the soul’s reaction to pain. Out of this
reaction to pain, it takes its second distinguishing character: its moral or political nature. While
the part of the soul that we describe as epithumetic seems to have to do with the body’s desire for
other bodily things, thumos seems to be the soul’s reaction to other souls, and its core seems to
lie in our reactions to the pain that other souls cause us and our friends.108
Thumos itself, as noted above, is not a reasonable faculty of the soul. But it is understood
by both Plato and Aristotle to be one that is more closely allied with reason. Plato famously
places the two non-rational parts of his tripartite soul in the harnesses of the chariot guided by
reason in the Phaedrus. There, thumos is represented as a brave and noble charger, while desire
is a dilapidated and mangy old nag that must be constantly trained to acquiesce to reason by the
already more noble thumetic steed (Phaedrus 253d and following). Aristotle claims in
Nichomachean Ethics that actions performed out of thumos are more natural and in accord with
reason than actions performed from motives of physical desire (Nich. Eth. 1149b8). The close
connection of thumos to reason explains why both rhetoric and poetry, as we shall see below,
although they are apprehended cognitively, affect thumos so strongly. In good poetry, as
mentioned above, the plot is the most important and most moving aspect of the play. The mind
apprehends the plot as the most intelligible portion of the drama. The close connection of
thumos to reason explains why an intelligible thing (the plot) can affect thumos, the non-rational
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part of the soul. If we may borrow Plato’s analogy, upon hearing a tragedy, reason gives freer
reign to its thumetic steed, and the soul is moved by the tragic emotions.
Second, one objection ought to be answered. It may be argued that a didactic view of
tragedy is unworthy of its status as a great poetic art, that it reduces tragedy to petty moralizing
rather than reflection on the tragic character of the world, or some other higher goal.109 This
objection, however, can only arise from a modern critic. As noted above, the distinction between
fine arts and useful arts was simply not made in Aristotle’s thought on the matter. A tentative
distinction between arts such as medicine and agriculture on the one hand, and mimetic arts, on
the other, indeed existed, but nowhere does Aristotle claim that one art is more useful than
another. In fact, the Poetics quite clearly claims, as noted above, that tragedy has an end external
to itself; namely, the catharsis of pity, fear, and other such emotions in its audience. He leaves us
no room to view tragedy as an art for art’s sake. That the Greeks at large shared his view we can
gather from the simple fact that they referred to the great tragic poets as didaskaloi; that is,
teachers.110 Unlike we moderns, the Greeks fostered no separation between art and life; and
thus, their life informed their art (through mimesis), and art informed, educated, and elevated the
lives of men (through catharsis).111
That tragedy did indeed serve to educate the Athenians (in this very broad sense)
Aristotle makes clear at several points in the Politics. Aristotle explicitly states that mimetic arts
in general are educative in Politics VIII. Music, he says, helps in forming right judgments and in
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taking delight in good and noble actions; rhythm, he says, imitates anger, and melody,
gentleness. (Aristotle, Politics, 1340a20) He notes, “enough has been said to show that music has
a power of forming the character, and should therefore be introduced into the education of the
young.” (Aristotle Politics 1340b8) 112 In the preceding book, Aristotle made clear that education
was not simply for the young: all citizens must learn to obey in their youth and rule in their
adulthood. (Aristotle Politics 133a5) In Book VIII, he discusses music education through the
different modes that clearly serve to provide education especially to adult citizens.113 While, in
his account, catharsis by music and by poetry remain different in their nature and function, as I
shall argue later, Aristotle connects them by virtue of their participation in the broader
educational schema of the Politics (Aristotle Politics 1341b35).
From the preceding examination, several claims can be drawn. First, that Aristotle
viewed mimetic arts such as music and poetry as educative to virtue, and second; that these arts
continue to serve an educative function after a man is “educated,” i.e., his education is
completed. The educative function of these arts rather than their pleasurable nature is their true
end, as Aristotle states explicitly in Book VIII:
συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος: ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονήν τινα
καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην
ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων ἔχειν ὁμοίωμά τι. (Aristotle Politics 1339b3235)
It sometimes happens that men make amusement the end, for the end probably
contains some element of pleasure, though not any ordinary or lower pleasure; but
they mistake the lower for the higher, and in seeking for the one find the other, since
every pleasure has a likeness to the end of action.

ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι δύναται ποιόν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο
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Aristotle’s Politica, Ross 1957. All translations come from McKeon 1941.
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The end, says Aristotle, is not the pleasure we draw from these arts, for these arts are simply rest,
relaxation, and in some cases, encouragement on the journey toward the final end; namely,
eudaimonia.114 Aristotle says that music and leisurely arts provide an “alleviation of past toil”
and “recreation” but also having “an influence on character and the soul.” (Aristotle Politics
1340a5) Aristotle paints a portrait of the arts as therapeutic: their function is to give rest,
purification, and encouragement for the soul. In Aristotle’s ideal state, just as the legislators
would prescribe physical training for health of the body, so they would prescribe musical and
poetic training for the health of the soul. This education would be continuing and remedial.
My claims regarding the therapeutic function of art may hold true for the mimetic arts as
a whole, but what of tragedy in particular? I contend that the positions we have inferred from the
Politics can be applied; namely, that tragedy serves as an educational recreation that reforms the
soul after traumatic events and prepares us to face future difficulties. This process is known as
catharsis.115 Education and recreation stand not as opposites in Aristotle’s Politics but rather in
the relation of part and whole: education is a very broad political institution which includes all
activities that shape the well-being of the body and soul, including recreative activities like the
mimetic arts.116 Such is Aristotle’s view of tragedy in the Politics. Furthermore, Aristotle
indicates that the positions advocated in the Politics hold true for the Poetics as well. In the
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Politics, he refers to a further treatment of poetic catharsis, indicating that the two treatments of
poetry are consistent:
φαμὲν δ᾽ οὐ μιᾶς ἕνεκεν ὠφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειόνων χάριν
(καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν
ἁπλῶς, πάλιν δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς περὶ [40] ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον…(Aristotle Politics
1341b37-40)
But we maintain further that music should be studied, not for the sake of one, but of
many benefits, that is to say, with view to education, purgation, (the word purgation
we use at present without explanation, but when hereafter we speak of poetry, we
will treat the subject with more precision)…
Thus, following Aristotle, we may turn from this examination of education in the Politics to the
Poetics for our investigation of the political function of catharsis. 117
Aristotle sadly does not treat catharsis much more extensively in the Poetics, but he does
at least give us a more definite idea of the passions that catharsis affects. Aristotle notes that
they are pity, fear, and other such passions. Our task, then, is to classify these passions
according to their proper function in the soul, discovering in the process what the phrase “other
such passions” means in the Poetics. In order to examine pity, fear, and “other such passions”
we turn to the Rhetoric. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle lists anger, calmness, friendship, enmity, fear,
confidence, shame, shamelessness, kindness, unkindness, pity, indignation, envy, and emulation
as the emotions to be influenced by political rhetoric. Each of these emotions is thumetic in
nature. Nowhere does Aristotle speak of inciting the passions of the body: lust, hunger, greed,
and the like lie outside the scope of his rhetoric. Aristotle treats of these thumetic emotions while
discussing the nature and purpose of political rhetoric, because he viewed these emotions as
essentially political in nature and indeed necessary for the proper functioning of the polis. This
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would make catharsis a cleansing of thumos as part of a specifically political education, as
reinforcing my claim above in the discussion of the Politics.
At the beginning of this chapter we saw the place of thumos in the soul; reversing Plato’s
ordo operandi, let us now turn to its role in the city. A closer examination of the role of thumos
in the city will reveal the context in which the thumos might become disordered and in need of
catharsis. Understanding the context of this disorder will allow a firmer understanding of the
nature of the catharsis that treats this disorder. Let us begin with an examination of the role of
thumos. Aristotle recognizes the major role that thumos plays in the functioning of the polis in
both political and military roles. When speaking of the proper character of the citizens of the
ideal polis, Aristotle recommends the spirited (thumetic) emotions:
τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος, ὥσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ [30] τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν
μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἔνθυμον καὶ διανοητικόν ἐστιν: διόπερ ἐλεύθερόν τε διατελεῖ καὶ
βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν
αὐτὴν δ᾽ ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη πρὸς ἄλληλα: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειτὴν
φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν
τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ διανοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας
εὐαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. ὅπερ γάρ φασί τινες δεῖν
ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικοὺς μὲν εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας
ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν: αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις ᾗ
φιλοῦμεν. σημεῖον δέ: πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἢ
πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος προσηκόντως τοῖς
φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν: “σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεαι.” καὶ
τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν: ἀρχικὸν γὰρ
καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμός. οὐ καλῶς δ᾽ ἔχει λέγειν χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας:
πρὸς οὐθένα γὰρ εἶναι χρὴ τοιοῦτον, οὐδέ εἰσιν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι,
πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας. (Aristotle, Politics 1327b30-28a10)
The Hellenic race, which is situated between them (Europeans and Asians) is
likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and intelligent. And clearly
those whom the legislator will most easily lead to virtue may be expected to be both
intelligent and courageous. Some say that the guardians should be friendly towards
those whom they know, fierce towards those whom they do not know. Now, passion
is the quality of the soul which begets friendship and enables us to love; notably the
spirit within us is more stirred against our friends and acquaintances than against
those who are unknown to us, when we think that we are despised by them; for
which reason Archilochus, complaining of his friends, very naturally addresses his
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soul in these words ‘For surely thou are plagued on account of friends.’ The power
of command and the love of freedom in all men are based upon this quality, for
passion is commanding and invincible. Nor is it right to say that the guardians
should be fierce towards those whom they do not know, for we ought not to be out of
temper with any one; and a lofty spirit is not fierce by nature, but only when excited
against evil-doers.
Here Aristotle notes that the best citizens are spirited. Aristotle speaks of courage (and
thus its opposite, fear) he speaks of friendship and fierceness (perhaps the effect of indignation
and anger), and the ability to love (perhaps including kindness and pity). Aristotle’s point is
clear: the good citizen is a spirited one. In Athens, the citizen was also a soldier, so by
implication at least, thumos is also a military virtue. As in Plato’s Republic, Aristotle naturally
associates the spirited character with the defense of the city. Though the paragraph quoted above
does not specifically mention the military, it is strong with implication: the fierceness of the
spirited toward strangers, the quotation from Archilochus (the servant of Ares and of the Muses),
and the speech regarding strife all invite us to consider thumos in a military context. The whole
passages comes in a more overtly military context: Aristotle speaks of Greece as the proper mean
between men of pure spiritedness (the barbarians of the north) and men of pure intelligence but
without spirit (the Asians of the south). He writes:
τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος, ὥσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ [30] τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως
ἀμφοῖν μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἔνθυμον καὶ διανοητικόν ἐστιν: διόπερ ἐλεύθερόν τε
διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον
πολιτείας. (Aristotle Politics 1327b29-32)
But the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in
character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the
best governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able
to rule the world.
The spirited virtues are the virtues of the citizen and the virtues of the soldier.
But spiritedness is not merely positive; it contains its own dangers. These dangers make
it susceptible to disorder and potentially in need of some catharsis. Aristotle directly refers to
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Plato’s account of spiritedness in the Republic above when he writes that “some say that the
guardians should be friendly towards those whom they know, fierce towards those whom they do
not know.” In the Republic, Plato is less optimistic about the positive potency of the spirited
soul, and seems to think that this is about all we can hope for from thumos: intense friendship
toward the familiar, and intense dislike toward the unfamiliar.118 Aristotle too is not without
qualms regarding the spirited element of the soul: “Spiritedness is a passion that is bestial in its
disposition, unrelenting in its hold, harsh and violent in its power, a cause of murders, ally of
misfortune, companion of injury, instigator of dishonor and waste of substance, and finally, of
destruction.”119 We may say that the spirited character is a double-edged sword; it may bite both
ways. Immoderation of thumos is dangerous to the city; thus the need for catharsis.
Greek literature since the Iliad has emphasized war as a primary cause of immoderation
with respect to thumos. The Muses have sung not once but again and again of soldiers’ wrath
leading them to commit villainy. When Aristotle and Plato speak of the guardians needing to be
friendly to citizens while at the same time fierce to enemies, it is easy to imagine that they had
seen warriors unable to act as friendly toward friends as they once had, after living for years in a
state of fierceness toward enemies.120 Lawrence Tritle argues that Xenophon’s portrait of
Clearchus paints just such a picture. Clearchus, like Socrates, was a survivor of the
Peloponnesian War, but instead of turning to the consolations of philosophy, he could only be
cheerful and friendly to comrades in battle. Tritle writes, “Clearchus dedicated his whole life to
the pursuit of war, preparing for it in every way possible, even relishing the experience of battle.
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Xenophon says that in going into battle his ‘forbidding look seemed positively cheerful.’”121
Tritle also notes that ancient authors also speak of the other extreme. Gorgias, in his Encomium
on Helen speaks of soldiers so deprived of spirit by war that they cannot bear even to see its
instruments:
When warriors put on their armor and weapons, some for defense and others for
offense, the mere sight of these terrifies the souls of some, who flee panic-stricken
even from anticipated dangers as if these were really present…And later some of
these men lose presence of mind, and others become unable to work, suffering from
terrible diseases or incurable madness.122
In each case, war has deprived these soldiers of the proper balance of spiritedness; Clearchus
seems to lack pity and the more friendly elements of the thumos, the soldiers Gorgias speaks of
seem to have too much fear, and have lost the confident aspects of their thumoi.123 Parallels
between these distant ancient accounts and accounts by veterans of the last few decades are
striking. Some modern veterans describe an intense fear of the trappings of war, some seem
unable to live without them. Shay describes veterans who find it difficult to live without a
weapon at hand, who would wander dangerous parts of the city in search of an experience
similar to combat, and who remained constantly hypervigilant.124 Veterans can also experience
an opposite desire to be entirely free of anything that might remind them of combat. I personally
know a decorated captain, courageous in combat, who instinctively dropped to the ground
pulling his wife with him whenever he heard a sudden loud noise. He did this for months after
his return from a particularly difficult deployment to Afghanistan, and only could stop after long
and painful treatment that reversed the habituations he developed while overseas. He suffered
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from disorderly anger. He was unable to enjoy himself in public environments because he could
not relax when he was unable to cover his back. The worst cases seem to combine excess fear of
the trappings of war with the desire for the adrenaline rush of combat and the lack of the ability
to feel with others (compassion) and hence the inability to pity.125
Soldiers develop these disorders of the thumos as survival mechanisms. The very strength
of thumos that can lead a soldier to commit dastardly deeds is also the surest guarantor of
survival in a combat situation. The ability to react quickly and fiercely to an attack is an
indispensable function of fighting spirit. In more difficult situations, when deliberation is
possible but decisiveness is essential, it is still thumos that makes a soldier able to carry out the
sometimes very difficult dictates of his reason. Sometimes the cost of saving one’s own life or
the lives of one’s comrades comes at a bitter cost, not only for the enemy or civilians but also for
one’s future psychological health. Shay writes how
One Marine veteran in our program is hounded by the memory of a close friend who
was wounded, unable to move, and screaming in agony for someone to please kill
him. The North Vietnamese were using him as bait for their ambush and killed one
after another would-be rescuer. Our patient, seeing no alternative, shot his friend to
prevent more deaths. Another man is tormented by the memory of entering a village
from the south while other, inexperienced soldiers were entering it from the east. A
Vietnamese baby was sitting in the crossroads at the center of the village. Our
patient could see remote trigger wires running to the spot under the baby and began
to shout and wave his arms at the other soldiers not to go near the baby. The other
soldiers could not hear and simply waved back. Seeing no alternative, our patient
fired a burst from his M-60 into the baby, setting off a large explosion.126
In each case, the veteran could have simply waited indecisively, fearing any action, as all
actions would end badly.127 Though in each case we justly shrink from calling their decision the
right one, we can hardly call it the wrong one. These soldiers had run upon situations in which
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there was no right choice, and their strong thumoi, profitable servants of their reason, when a
right and wrong choice were available, became their psychological downfall when faced with
equally terrible horns of a dilemma.128 Once the thumos leads us to commit such a dreadful
action, it often becomes wild and broken, leading to disordered emotions over which the reason
has lost control. Well might the soul cease to operate by reason, when reason had dictated so
monstrous a deed.
In sum, the thumetic emotions are salutary and indeed necessary for the polis and indeed
essential for survival in combat, but if the thumos is injured, thumetic passions can begin to harm
rather than assist the polis. The right measure of calmness and anger makes a man angry at
injustice to the right amount, the right measure of fear and confidence makes a man a courageous
soldier,129 the right measure of pity allows him to feel pity when he ought and steel himself to the
suffering of another when he ought, the right measure of shame and shamelessness preserves a
man’s honor without paralyzing him by fear of shame, etc. Keeping these passions at the mean
is the stuff of the virtue of a citizen and a soldier. This is indeed Aristotle’s definition of courage:
a mean between fear and confidence. (Aristotle Nich. Eth. 1115a8) When combat trauma has
undone the order of the soul, barring some therapy, it is unable to maintain the mean of virtue.
Given that catharsis attempts to cleanse thumos of immoderation through arousing
thumetic emotions, it would stand to reason that tragedy is essentially thumetic in character. I
have already noted the prevalence of thumos in Oedipus Tyrannos.130 I argue that we see the
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same thumos at work in nearly every single Greek drama. Medea is outstandingly thumetic,
Antigone is a more noble, but as strongly spirited, soul, Eteocles brings on his ruin through his
confidence, in the Oresteia, Agamemenon, Cassandra, Cytemnestra, Electra, and Orestes are all
particularly spirited individuals, Ajax, of course, is the very soul of thumos, Philoktetes’ rage is
proverbial, Prometheus’ overconfidence and raging furor is extremely thumetic in character. Of
the surviving tragedies, only one tragedy is driven by passions other than thumetic ones.
Euripides’ Hippolytus features Phaedra driven mad by lust. Her lust is aroused, however, by an
angered Aphrodite. The slight of Hippolytus131 has angered Aphrodite, and she, because of her
anger, causes the deaths of Phaedra and Hippolytus. In tragedy, even the goddess of erotic love
takes on a thumetic character. Carnes Lord sums up the situation as follows: “The passions
associated with spiritedness—fear, pity, indignation, anger, jealousy, love of honor—are the
common fare of tragic poetry and the very idea of the tragic would seem intimately connected
with the ambivalent nature of these passions.”132 In short, tragedy is the story of the operation of
thumos.
Though a careful and complete examination of any of the tragedies listed above is outside
the scope of this paper, even a cursory glance indicates that thumos leads to the undoing of their
tragic heroes. If we may return to Oedipus, his spirited defense of the city against the plague
causes his undoing. Teiresias says as much: Oedipus’ demand to know the source of pollution in
the city is the request in which he errs (hamartanei).133 It is Oedipus’ unrelenting will to
knowledge that causes him harm. A man of weaker spirit might have simply obeyed the
warnings of Teiresias and left the Thebans to suffer; but Oedipus, strong-willed as he was,
demanded to know the knowledge that would be his undoing. It seems we may draw the
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conclusion that tragic hamartiai can be accurately described as the situation in which a thumetic
character comes up against a dilemma in which there is no right choice.134 The tragedy could
sometimes have been avoided if the tragic hero were a weaker man; hence Jocasta advises
Oedipus, “why should man fear since chance is all in all for him, and he can clearly foreknow
nothing? Best to live lightly as one can, unthinkingly.”135 Oedipus’ thumos, though, prevents
him from passively living out the easy life that Jocasta urges on him: he must act and choose,
and in his case, any active choice was a tragic one.
If thumos is indeed the real source of tragic hamartiai, it deserves a more careful
examination. In particular, it is necessary to distance this claim from the argument mentioned in
our previous chapter that the hamartia is in essence a moral flaw or an imperfection in character.
Two key points distance the thumetic interpretation of hamartia from the “moral flaw” notion of
hamartia. First, the spirited emotions are ambivalent. They make a character strong towards
good or evil. A man of very strong spirit may remain virtuous as long as he preserves a mean in
the particular elements of his spirit. Aristotle does not speak of preserving a mean of spiritedness
as one can regulate the other passions; rather, he accepts spiritedness as a given fact of life.136
Carnes Lord writes,
For Aristotle as for Plato, however, the phenomenon of spiritedness appears to be of
fundamental importance for understanding of human sociality, and thereby the limits
or the nature of political life in particular; and for both the phenomenon of
spiritedness is profoundly problematic. Spiritedness is indispensible for the best city
just as it is an inescapable fact of political life as such; but it represents at the same
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time a grave danger, as it constantly threatens the predominance in politics of
prudence or reason.137
A strong spirit is not itself, therefore, a flaw in character like an immoderate physical passion is.
It is, in the true sense of the word, ambivalent: strong in either direction. When a man of spirit is
also a man of wisdom, he is both a great and a good man. But when a man of spirit errs, no
matter how small that error may be, or even whether the error is his own ‘fault,’ as we might say,
his error is tragic. Secondly, a strong spirit, rather than heightening the guilt of a man’s error,
actually tends to exonerate him from responsibility. Aristotle writes of the degrees of
responsibility one may have for a harmful action:
τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ᾽ ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτήματά
ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ: ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν ἢ
οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾠήθη,
οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὅν, ἢ οὐχ ᾧ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ
βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα: ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἁμάρτημα （
ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ᾽ ὅταν ἔξωθεν）: ὅταν
δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη,
ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ
ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα
οὐδὲ πονηροί: οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη: ὅταν δ᾽ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ
μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται: οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ
ποιῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ
τοῦ δικαίου: ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν.138 (Aristotle Nich. Eth.
1135b11-35)
When it is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but does not imply vice, it is a
mistake (for a man makes a mistake when the fault originates in him, but is the
victim of accident when the origin lies outside him). When he acts with knowledge
but not after deliberation, it is an act of injustice—e.g. the acts due to anger or to
other passions necessary or natural to man; (thumetic passions) for when men do
such harmful and mistaken acts they act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice,
but this does not imply that the doers are unjust or wicked; for the injury is not due to
vice. But when a man acts from choice, he is an unjust man and a vicious man.
Hence acts proceeding from anger are rightly judged not to be done of malice
aforethought; for it is not the man who acts in anger but he who enraged him that
starts the mischief.
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Here Aristotle notes that a mistake (hamartema) may be the cause of an unjust act (adikema)
while the man who commits the mistake is not viewed as an unjust (adikaios) man, but rather
may have committed the action through anger (thumos), meaning that although the action is
unjust (adikaios) the man himself remains just. Aristotle further remarks regarding the
shamefulness of wrongdoing due to thumos:
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη,
καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ
ἁπλῶς, δῆλον. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν,
θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ
οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἳ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα
ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον
ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν: οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα τῆς φύσεως
ἀκούσας μέν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ᾽ ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ
ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὃ δ᾽ ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ
τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς: ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ
λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ᾽ ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ
πως, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία οὔ. αἰσχίων οὖν: ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως
ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου. ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη
ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι,
καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον κοιναί: ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν
τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων. (Aristotle, Nich. Eth. 1149a25-b8)
That incontinence in respect of anger is less disgraceful than that in respect of the
appetites is what we will now proceed to see. Anger seems to listen to argument to
some extent, but to mishear it, as do hasty servants who run out before they have
heard the whole of what one says, and then muddle the order, or as dogs bark if there
is but a knock at the door, before looking to see if it is a friend; so anger by reason of
the warmth and hastiness of its nature, though it hears, does not hear an order, and
springs to take revenge. For argument or imagination informs us that we have been
insulted or slighted, and anger, reasoning as it were that anything like this must be
fought against, boils up straightway...Therefore anger obeys the argument in a
sense…Further we pardon people more easily for following natural desires, since we
pardon them more easily for following such appetites as are common to all men, and
in so far as they are common; now anger and bad temper are more natural than the
appetites for excess.
Aristotle claims that he who acts out of passion (thumos) is less guilty than he who acts out of
appetite. Thumetic passions are more natural and understandable, and more in alliance with
reason, than the appetites. In the paragraph quoted above, Aristotle perhaps borrows Plato’s
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analogy of the spirited soul to a good guard-dog (Aristotle, NE 1149a25-b8, Plato, Republic
375e-376c). Sometimes, not through a moral fault of its own, but through its own particular
excellence (that of guardianship), a guard dog will react improperly to a situation, e.g., barking at
an unannounced friend rather than a foe. This analysis fits perfectly with the understanding of
hamartia noted above: the particular excellence of the tragic hero dooms him to misfortune, not
through his fault, but through the disjunction between that excellence and his circumstances. The
small amount of moral responsibility that we find in an action committed out of anger is mirrored
in Aristotle’s description of the tragic hero and his fall: he is a good and noble man, perhaps just
slightly above our own nobility, with, however, some slight irregularities of character. The
hamartia is the minor irregularity in the character of the hero meeting the major imperfections
and contradictions in the hero’s surroundings. The result is a tragic punishment that far
outweighs the faults that it punishes.
Let us take stock of the conclusions we have reached thus far. First, Aristotle and the
Athenians viewed tragedy as an educative and therapeutic tool that could help the soul recover
from past travails and prepare it to act virtuously in the future. Second, the emotions of tragedy
(toiauta ta pathemata) are the thumetic emotions, and tragedy takes place in society where
thumos is held in high regard, particularly among the gentleman-soldier class, but indeed among
all citizens, as all citizens were soldiers. Third, we might also note that the thumetic emotions
are the political emotions, and that they are mentioned in Aristotle in the context of political
education and political rhetoric. Fourth, using Greek terms, we might define combat trauma as
radical upsetting of the balance among thumetic emotions. Fifth, thumetic emotions were the
driving force in tragedy, and whatever part of the hamartia lies in the tragic hero often does so as
excess of thumos. From these several statements, we may conclude that tragedy was part of a
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system of political education designed to restore the damaged thumoi of Athens’ citizen-soldiers
by a certain catharsis, through pity and fear, of such emotions. (Aristotle Poetics 1449b27) “Such
emotions,” given the grouping in the Rhetoric, are thumetic emotions. We may therefore venture
a claim on the nature of catharsis: tragic catharsis is the purgation, through pity and fear, of
thumetic emotions as part of political education in order to return the soul to the mean.139 Put in
terms of Plato’s analogy of the soul, catharsis restores the proper relationship of horse and rider
between thumos and reason by regulating the excesses of thumos. Notably, this situates catharsis
as having the greatest effect toward those who have strong thumoi and whose thumoi may be in
some sense disordered or traumatized. Both of those points make catharsis particularly salient
for the combat veteran or anyone who knew a combat veteran.140 Having thus defined the nature
of catharsis, the task of our final chapter is to establish the means through which catharsis
cleanses thumos.

Chapter IV: A Closer Look at Catharsis
In the last chapter I established the nature of catharsis, arguing that it was the purgation,
through pity and fear, of thumetic emotions as part of political education in order to return the
soul to the mean. Several theories have dominated the discussion about catharsis for the past
several centuries. Each of these theories makes a claim regarding both the nature of catharsis
and the means by which catharsis worked. I have already established my own argument for the
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nature of catharsis. I shall therefore proceed by testing the traditional theories against this new
definition of catharsis as purgation of thumos and against what we know more specifically about
the reason that such purgation is needed; namely, combat trauma. The dominant three theories of
catharsis have been 1) a purgation of pity and fear, often taken to be a total purgation and release
of those emotions through homeopathic exposure, 2) a purification of pity and fear, through
turning these painful emotions into a tragic pleasure or an elevation of sentiment through high
style, 3) an education that moderates the passions and orders the soul. Having examined and
identified the strengths and weaknesses of each theory in turn, I shall propose my own theory of
how catharsis must have functioned, one based on the work of combat trauma therapists together
with my previous argument regarding combat trauma and thumos.
Proposed most forcefully by Jacob Bernays in his essay entitled Grundzüge der
verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, published in 1857, the first
theory has perhaps been the most popular since that time.141 The view argues that tragic
catharsis is a medical metaphor for the purgation of impurities. According to this theory:
The thought, as he [Bernays] interpreted it, may be expressed thus. Tragedy excites
the emotions of pity and fear—kindred emotions that are in the breasts of all men—
and by the act of excitation affords a pleasurable relief. The feelings called forth by
the tragic spectacle are not indeed permanently removed, but are quieted for the time,
so that the system can fall back upon its normal course. The stage, in fact, provides a
harmless and pleasurable outlet for instincts which demand satisfaction, and which
can be indulged here more fearlessly than in real life.142
Bernays’ theory, as is evident from the above paragraph, argues that catharsis purges pity and
fear through the experience of pity and fear. S.H. Buchner, concurring with Bernay’s theory,
writes, “pity and fear, artificially stirred, expel the latent pity and fear which we bring with us
from real life, or at least, such elements in them as are disquieting. In the pleasurable calm
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which follows when the passion is spent, an emotional cure has been wrought.”143 Scholars who
espouse this view tend to draw their support from medical or religious analogies or from
Aristotle’s treatment of the catharsis of enthusiasm in the Politics.144 There, Aristotle writes:
οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δ᾽ ἐνθουσιασμός: καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως
κατοκώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν, ἐκ τῶν δ᾽ ἱερῶν μελῶν ὁρῶμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται
τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ
καθάρσεως: ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς
φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως παθητικούς, τοὺς ἄλλους καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν
τοιούτων ἑκάστῳ, καὶ πᾶσι γίγνεσθαί τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς.
(Aristotle Politics 1342a5-15)
For feelings such as pity and fear, or again, enthusiasm, exist very strongly in some
souls, and have more or less influence over all. Some persons fall into a religious
frenzy, whom we see as a result of the sacred melodies—when they have used the
melodies that excite the soul to mystic frenzy—restored as though they had found
healing and purgation (catharsis). Those who are influenced by pity or fear, and
every emotional nature, must have a like experience, and others in so far as each is
susceptible to such emotions, and all are in a manner purged and their souls lightened
and delighted.
Proponents of the purely purgative view of catharsis cite this paragraph as evidence that the
musical catharsis of enthusiasm of which Aristotle speaks is the same as the poetic catharsis of
pity and fear. A careful analysis of the passage, however, reveals just the opposite. First, as
quoted before, Aristotle is here speaking of catharsis simply or generally, and will speak of
poetic catharsis more specifically at a later time. (Aristotle Politics 1341b38-40) Carnes Lord
writes of this section of the Politics, “his account of catharsis will be a general account which
dispense with the ‘distinctions’ that would be required in an accurate or clear account of
particulars.”145 Therefore, even at first glance, taking this general interpretation of catharsis to
explain the more specific poetic one (which sadly is not explained further as Aristotle promises)
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would be a risky endeavor. Furthermore, specific textual evidence leads us away from such an
endeavor. Lord further explains the passage:
According to Aristotle, the catharsis of pity and fear is effective not only in the case
of the pitying or the fearful or the “passionate” generally but also in the case of
“others insofar as each is infected by such things”: the “certain catharsis” (katharsis
tis) of which Aristotle speaks here is a catharsis which affects “all” (1342a14). As
for enthusiasm, Aristotle says only that it is a “passion” (pathos) which affects
“every soul” in some degree, and that “certain people” (tines) who come to be
“possessed” (katokochimoi) by it are to obtain a healing and catharsis by listening to
a certain kind of enthusiastic music, the “sacred tunes.”146
In short, while tragic catharsis has a universally salutary effect, catharsis of enthusiasm by music
seems to effect different people in radically different ways. Regarding these cathartic melodies,
Lord notes:
Generally speaking, the tunes of Olympus affect men precisely by making them
“enthusiastic.” Unlike the catharsis of pity and fear, the catharsis of enthusiasm does
not affect all; it is not a necessary consequence of the experience of enthusiastic
music. It would rather seem that enthusiastic music (or enthusiastic music of a
certain kind) effects a catharsis of enthusiasm only in the case of those who were
“possessed” by the passion of enthusiasm prior to and independently of any
experience of enthusiastic music.147
The purgation of enthusiasm is radical and complete. As Lord remarks,148 there is no half-way
purging or purification of enthusiasm. Enthusiastic possession, was likely, as he points out, a
kind of pathological condition diagnosed by the Greeks, and as such, they sought complete
purgation of its impurity.149 The catharsis of pity and fear, then, is radically different. Its
efficacy is more or less universal, while its purgation is not complete. Total purgation of pity
and fear, for Aristotle, would be a nightmare. Pity and fear are passions that, if felt in the mean,
are salutary and virtuous, as noted above. Total purgation of them is precisely not what those
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who have experience trauma seek: they desire to feel them in the right places at the right time,
and have some measure of rational control over them. To be utterly deprived of them spells
psychological disaster. Another weakness of the purgation theory is that it fails to explain
Aristotle’s mention in the Poetics of the other thumetic emotions that the plot of a tragedy
catharses through pity and fear. 150 Addressing only pity and fear, it leaves the “other such
passions” completely out of the picture.
The purification hypothesis is less commonly held now than it was before, and by no
means as clear or even as grounded in Aristotle’s text as the other. It avoids the pitfall of
identifying enthusiastic with tragic catharsis, but it fails to provide any other clear method of
catharsis. It is often presented in different lights; however, its main tenets rely on tragedy to
elevate and enlighten the passions through art. The view, although possessing significant
pedigree since the time of the Renaissance, has largely fallen out of favor in more recent times.
Jonathan Lear (who disagrees with the theory himself) quotes one proponent, Eduard Muller, as
saying the following: “Who can any longer doubt that the purification of pity, fear, and other
passions consists in, or at least is very closely connect with, the transformation of the pain that
engendered them into pleasure?”151 As Lear succinctly points out, Aristotle never speaks of such
a transformation: the painful events of tragedy remain painful. We may derive a certain pleasure
from tragedy, but that pleasure, as noted in Chapter II, stems from the recognition of an
imitation. We can only recognize painful events in an imitation precisely if those events remain
painful.
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Buchner provides another purification hypothesis. He maintains elements of the
purgation theory, adding that the elevated nature of tragedy elevates our own sentiments and
therefore purifies our pity and fear. In tragedy, he claims:
We are not confronted with outward conditions of life too like our own. The
pressure of immediate reality is removed; we are not painfully reminded of the cares
of our own material existence. We have here part of the refining process which the
tragic emotions undergo within the region of art.152
No doubt elements of his hypothesis are true. Oftentimes the tragic hero is quite removed from
lived experience, and certain elements of tragedy (lofty staging, beautiful diction, etc.) would
likely serve to elevate the scene above the ugliness of real suffering. However, if those more
beautiful elements of tragedy, through the working of the plot, fail to “painfully remind” us of
our own lived experience, mimesis has not been achieved. In the only discussion of catharsis in
the Poetics, Aristotle notes that catharsis takes place through mimesis of serious actions that
arouse pity and fear. Without a recognizable re-presentation of an action or of a type of action,
catharsis simply does not happen. Buchner’s mistake, I think, is endemic all nearly all
interpretations of catharsis.153 Simply put, he assumes that the lives of the Athenian audience
were not noble or tragic, as if the theater of Dionysus would not have been filled with soldiers,
generals, and politicians.154 It was indeed filled with those who had suffered, if not what
Oedipus suffered, at least like Oedipus suffered, as I argued in my first chapter.
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A third interpretation of catharsis makes it an education of character. Stephen Halliwell
cautiously proposes such a hypothesis:
Simply to identify tragic katharsis with a process of ethical exercise and habituation
for the emotions through art would be speculative and more than the evidence
justifies. But to suggest that these two things ought to stand in an intelligible relation
to one another (as the phrase ‘for education and katharsis’ at Pol. 1341b 38
encourages us to see them) is only to argue that tragic katharsis should be capable of
integration into Aristotle’s general philosophy of the emotions…155
Halliwell’s goal of integrating catharsis into the broader Aristotlelian philosophical schema is
indeed a laudable one. Indeed, I argued in the previous chapter that tragedy served as education
and purification of the thumos, and that catharsis was the means that it did so. The educative
view of catharsis, however, can be taken in different ways. My last chapter emphasized that
catharsis is part of an education of the passions. Halliwell interprets the educative nature of
catharsis in too literal a light, arguing that tragedy served as a moral habituation, teaching
citizens to feel pity and fear in the proper way, to the proper amount, in response to the proper
events. My argument for the thumetic nature of catharsis maintains its educative character while
eschewing the method of moral habituation with which Halliwell toys. Jonathan Lear, in
response to just this argument from Halliwell, points out that Aristotle’ treatment of catharsis in
Book VIII of the Politics (1342a) indicates that tragedy is best enjoyed by those already
educated; tragedy is best for those who have already learned the basic appropriate ways to
exercise pity and fear.156 It is my thesis that tragedy is intended for those who have indeed
learned virtuous responses to these events but either have unlearned them through trauma or
stand at risk of doing so. As Aristotle notes in the Politics (1341b), the arts for recreation
(including tragedy) serve those who have been worn out by past toils or are in need of
refreshment in order to face future ones boldly and well. Such a statement reaffirms that
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cartharsis is educative in nature, but that it is not so much a formation but a reformation of the
thumetic passions. Again, Halliwell does not take into account the fact that the tragic audience
would likely be in need of such reformation.
As noted above in my analysis of Buchner and Haliwell, the main weakness of the
theories presented above is that they take for granted certain facts about the tragic audience that
my first chapter calls into question. When writing of pity and fear in the Rhetoric, Aristotle
emphasizes the self-referential nature of those emotions. Fear, Aristotle writes, is a “pain or
disturbance due to a mental picture of some desructive or painful evil in the future.” (Aristotle
Rhetoric 1382a21)157 He writes, “from this definition it will follow that fear is caused by
whatever has great power of destroying us, or in harming us in ways that tend to cause us great
pain.” (Aristotle Rhetoric 1381a25)158 An event must be “imminent,” Aristotle writes, in order
that it cause us fear: “it therefore follows, that fear is felt by those who believe something to be
likely to happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, and at a
particular time.” (Aristotle Rhetoric 1382b34)159 While the tragic audience may not have the
particulars at hand, they must at least feel the likelihood of these particulars that cause fear
coming to bear on them in order that they feel true fear while watching tragedies. A tragedy is a
general imitation of type of an action, as Aristotle writes, so while the particular causes of fear
for his audience may not be present in the play, a mimetic imitation of them must be present.
Therefore, a tragic audience must at least be able to fear the same types of evils as the tragic hero
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suffers. They must relate to the tragic hero (as Aristotle notes in the Poetics), as to a man not
unlike themselves.
We may not expect pity to be as self-directed an emotion as fear, but for Aristotle, it is
hardly less so. He writes: “Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain caused by the sight of some
evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might
expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon.” (Aristotle
Rhetoric 1385b13)160 In short, in order that we are able to pity another person, that person must
not deserve the harshness of the punishment he receives, and that punishment must be the sort of
one we might expect to suffer ourselves. Aristotle notes that we cannot pity ourselves: an evil
that happens to us is terrible, rather than pitiable, and pity tends to be driven out by fear, when
they are felt for the same person in the same way. We can feel pity and fear at the same time,
however, as long as they are for different persons; pity for those removed from us, fear for
ourselves and those very close to us. (Aristotle Rhetoric 1386a20) On this reading of pity, we
cannot pity those evils to which we cannot in some way relate: only familiar disasters strike us
close enough to home that we can truly pity their victims. In order that pity and fear be aroused
in the tragic audience, they must consider that the evils experienced by the tragic characters
could potentially happen to them. Perhaps it is possible to take such a claim too literally. In
general, the danger that tragedy expresses is the fragility of human happiness and the ease with
which virtue is overturned. Halliwell writes,
Embodied in this chain of actions must be at least a partial movement towards
innocent (though not arbitrary) suffering, and the prospect or actuality of this
suffering must touch agents with whom an audience or reader can feel an essential
sympathy. I have tried to show that this notion of sympathy, which underlies both
pity and fear, is not a vaguely humanitarian instinct: it is the capacity to recognize a
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likeness which imports with it a sense that one could imagine suffering such things
oneself.161
In contrast to Halliwell’s understanding that the audience must be able to relate to the evils
experienced by the tragic characters, Buchner assumes his audience is not even reminded of their
own sufferings by the plight of the tragic hero. Alexander Nehamas, writing on the emotions of
pity and fear in the Poetics, claims:
We must still remember, however, that the pity felt in the tragic situation is felt
sympathetically, and it is not obvious how this latter experience can be transferred to
life: the point is not that it cannot, but that neither we nor Aristotle can assume that
the phenomenon needs no further elucidation.162
Nehamas’ analysis cannot accept the possibility that at least some significant portion of the tragic
audience would have been familiar with circumstances comparable to those in the tragedies. But
as noted above, those who have known deep tragedy in their lives do not need “further
elucidation” to understand the point of Sophocles’ dramas. To them it is quite clear. Lear makes
a similar blunder. While addressing the purification view of catharsis, he claims that “virtuous
people will experience a certain katharsis in the theater, but their emotional responses are in no
sense impure…”163 Lear seems to assume that virtue is unshakeable. If there is a single theme of
Attic tragedy, it seems to be the reverse. In the tragic outlook, virtue is fragile. Betrayal can
easily damage a virtuous life; hamartia can easily damage a virtuous life: this, indeed, seems to
be the entire substance of tragedy. Gerald Else slips into similar problems when wrestling with
the difficulties of his own interpretation of catharsis. He questions how a “normal” Athenian
citizen might be able to pity the plight of a tragic hero whose sufferings and deeds (in Else’s
estimation) are nothing like themselves. He writes, “on the contrary it is evident in every line of
the work that Aristotle is presupposing normal auditors, normal states of mind and feeling,
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normal emotional and aesthetic experience.”164 By claiming that the tragic audience was
“normal,” Else of course begs the question: whose “normal?” The normal audience of classical
Athens would be an audience largely composed either of combat veterans who had seen the
horrors of war face to face or those about to enter into the ranks.165 All of these authors go astray
by assuming that the Greek audience would have been incapable of relating to the extreme nature
of the tragic hero’s suffering. The key, I will argue, to understanding catharsis is assuming that
the Athenian tragic audience was a tragic audience in both senses of that phrase: they themselves
were tragic figures, insofar as they had seen the horrors of war, or, if they were young men who
had not yet deployed to combat, they would soon come to know them. At the very least they
would know a friend or family member who had fallen in one of Athens’ many wars. Sometimes,
therefore, we could expect mimesis to be as explicit as in the husband and wife referenced above
who ‘saw themselves’ in Ajax and Tecmessa. It need not be, however. As I mentioned in my
first chapter, combat trauma, is, in some sense, representative of the human condition at large.
This more expansive character of mimesis would allow any tragedy to provide catharsis for any
audience that could feel pity and fear when presented with the fate of the tragic hero. The closer
their association with that hero, they more effective the catharsis would become.
The analysis from the Rhetoric provided above simply requires that the audience have such
an association. In order that we pity and fear the tragic hero, there must be some chance that
events similar to those he experienced happen to us or might happen to us. In other words, we
must be in such a situation that we already recognize or are taught to recognize by the tragedy
itself that we face very real risks of insanity, betrayal, and death in order for catharsis to work at
all. Such an audience is not Else’s “normal” audience, nor Lear’s mild, virtuous folk, nor those
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trapped in Nehamas’ petty everyday existence. For catharsis to function by means of pity and
fear, at least some of the audience must have already experienced deeply traumatic events of
some character. As I have mentioned, Doerries has performed Ajax and Philoktetes for
American military soldiers and veterans around the globe. Describing the soldiers and their
families for whom the plays were performed, he reflects:
to them and to thousands of other military families, Sophocles’ plays were not
museum pieces or ‘problem plays,’ as classicists had so often labeled them; nor were
the performances jarringly extreme. To them, no matter how abrasive or emotionally
charged the actors’ voices became, this was kitchen-sink realism.166
While Doerries and his audience may not have a precise and scholarly definition of
catharsis ready at hand, they have seen it at work. Greek tragedies only become museum pieces
and ‘problem plays,’ and catharsis only becomes an insoluble puzzle of endless scholarly debate
when scholars cease to really understand the context of the plays.
I believe the understanding of the importance of the tragic that I have presented demands
a radical revision in the way scholars understand catharsis. While this theory may be new to
classicists, clinical psychologists have now been practicing it for years, though not in connection
with Aristotle’s Poetics. (Indeed, given what I have written, it would be a sign of monumental
hubris on my part to propose a completely new theory.) Shay is one of the clinical psychologists
who have been practicing this method of therapy. I will quote his method at length, and then, as
he himself indeed does, note the similarities between his own method and what we know of
Athenian tragic theater. His method does not precisely match Aristotle’s understanding of
catharsis, but with the minor modifications I present below, it certainly illuminates our
understanding of it.
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It is necessary to begin our examination of Shay’s theory by understanding the nature of
trauma. Trauma in its very nature breaks apart the convenient logical strings of causes that we
use to connect the events in our lives. Shay explains:
Severe trauma explodes the cohesion of consciousness. When a survivor creates
fully realized narrative that brings together the shattered knowledge of what
happened, the emotions that were aroused by the meanings of the events, and the
bodily sensations that the physical events created, the survivor pieces back together
the fragmentation of consciousness that trauma has caused.167
In short, connecting traumatic events as if those events were “necessary and probable,” in
Aristotle’s phrase, allows a trauma survivor to reestablish an intelligible order encompassing the
seemingly episodic events he has experienced. Doing so allows him to regain at least some
perspective on his experiences: he can look at them, as it were, from the outside, or look back on
them, as if they had come to an end. This narrative formation can be effective if the narrative
becomes communalized. Shay writes, “Narrative heals personality changes only if the survivor
finds or creates a trustworthy community of listeners for it. Several traits are required for the
audience to be trustworthy.”168 Shay then lists the requirements for the audience: the audience
must be strong enough to listen without themselves being traumatized, they must be able to listen
without blaming the victim with moral guilt, and the audience must be ready to experience some
of the same emotions that the traumatized veteran experiences.169 In short, the audience must be
able to relate emotionally to the experiences of the trauma victim. They must summon the same
emotions as the emotions related by the trauma victim. Ideally, the audience has been in similar
circumstances, or at least can understand the circumstances to some extent. Shay insists that
“without emotion in the listener there is no communalization of the trauma.”170 In Shay’s
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experience, when the trauma victim cannot make the audience understand or relate, he forces the
audience to feel similar emotions to those that he felt: “intimidation, ‘acting out,’ and creating
impossible situations sometimes aim at coercing the therapist to feel the fear and helplessness
that the survivor felt. This is coercive communalization.”171 Shay is describing, in essence, a
mimesis by force. The ability to form this community of feeling without placing judgments on
the value of the victim’s suffering is essential to successful therapy: “all who hear should
understand that no person’s suffering can be measured against any other person’s suffering. It
can be extremely damaging if anyone makes comparisons.”172 Shay speaks of what he calls
(following the word choice of the veterans he treats) “pissing contests,” in which some
individuals or groups dismiss the trauma of another group as not as significant as their own. On
the other hand, some “hierarchies of suffering” are assembled to the detriment of the sufferers,
who refuse to see themselves as victims of trauma, thus eliminating the possibility for healing. A
communalization of the trauma precludes both possibilities. When a whole community shares
trauma, no one individual’s suffering is seen as less meaningful than another’s.
In summary, Shay’s method of treatment for trauma has two inseparable parts. The
treatment must include the creation of a narrative, and the sharing of that narrative inside a
meaningful community. The creation of narrative allows a veteran the perspective necessary to
view his own suffering as a discreet, intelligible action, which can then be understood and fit into
the complex tapestry of his life. The sharing of that narrative makes what was an individual
burden a communal bond.
To test if this theory of clinical treatment could explain how tragic catharsis functions, let
us turn to analyze the actual production of a Greek tragedy in a particularly military setting.
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Doerries presented his translation of Ajax and Philoktetes for a group of military men of all
varieties, with astounding results. Doerries writes in moving prose of the effect he observed on
the warriors who attended his production.173 I will provide a brief summary. Doerries arranged
a dramatic reading, in which members of his predominantly male audience were free to organize
themselves in groups as they chose. More senior Marines congregated toward the front of his
auditorium, more junior ones behind them. The Marines naturally formed groups according to
their units. So far, all was proceeding as if his performance had taken place in ancient Athens.
His production featured two, rather than three, tragedies. He chose Ajax and Philoktetes due to
the obvious martial content of those plays. After the production, he had planned to allow for
forty-five minutes of discussion. He had to cut off the conversation after three hours. His drama
allowed soldiers to express sentiments that they otherwise would likely never have said aloud, let
alone in public, let alone in front of their commanding officers and non-commissioned officers.
Likely no soldiers experienced a complete healing of combat trauma through Doerries’
production.174 But if it had formed a single part of one of two annual festivals (the Dionysia and
Lennaia), each featuring multiple tragedies and associated with many military trappings, one
may imagine its healing and preventative power. Warriors would have a chance to be reminded
(by none other than their fellow-soldiers and, in the case of Aeschylus and Sophocles, their
generals) of the fragility of human goodness and of the inevitability of suffering. Through the
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pity and fear that they shared, they would be allowed release from their excesses of anger, spite,
indignation, pity, and fear; that is, the disorders in their thumoi would be resolved.
This experience agrees with many of the stories told by Shay’s patients. They struggle to
experience compassion, that is, the ability to feel an emotion in common with another person.
One veteran described himself as watching himself do things in the third person, emotionally
separated from his family by a “dirty glass.”175 Putting back together the separated threads of
their experience through narrative allows them to once again feel along with others. As has been
noted, the capacity to feel along with others is the basis for pity and fear in Aristotle. The case
that catharsis is the purgation of thumetic passions, functioning through the communalization of
traumatic narrative, is compatible with Aristotle’s argument in the Poetics. That narrative is
essential to catharsis is stated explicitly. Aristotle counts muthos as the most important part of
tragedy, and that it is the means by which pity and fear are to be aroused, bringing catharsis
through pity and fear. He emphasizes the need for the muthos to have a necessary or probable
order, making it a distinct and intelligible whole, with a beginning, middle, and end. This allows
us to look at the narrative in its complete form, and see how each piece is connected. The worst
sort of plot, Aristotle writes, is one that lacks this logical cohesiveness. The episodic plot would
fail to provide catharsis for trauma because it would not reconnect the fragmented events that
traumatic experiences prevent us from reconciling in any necessary or probable order.
One may object that tragic drama presented a generic action (in the sense that it occurs
according to what is natural or what happens for the most part, as Aristotle says), rather than the
particular sufferings of individuals, and that the general nature of tragedy differs from Shay’s
methods. Shay wrote of creating individual narratives and sharing these narratives with others in
the community. In this respect, there is a genuine difference between the psychological method
175
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and Aristotle’s catharsis. However, we can still provide an interpretation of catharsis that adheres
to the principles of Shay’s method, if not the particulars. Tragedy takes individual tales of
suffering and unites them in the one collective story. Each sufferer views the tragedy as
reflecting his own sufferings, thus the individual nature of the narrative is not lost. The
commonality of the narrative presents sufferings, as Aristotle says, in a necessary or probable
form, allowing every individual sufferer to see his own plight in the plight of the tragic figures.
Further, this sort of communalization eliminates the possibility for the “pissing contests”
mentioned by Shay: when suffering is communalized with universal archetypes, there is no
longer a place for one to say, “your suffering at Potidaea was nothing compared to what I saw at
Delium,” or, “your little walk to Delium and back was a picnic compared to the Sicilian
expedition.” By thus eliminating the chance for “pissing contests” in the very process of
therapy, tragedy at its best would ensure an unbroken communal bond of shared emotion.
Finally, one may object that Aristotle gives no indication that catharsis is a communal
experience in the Poetics. I respond with three points. First, we may glean the following from
Aristotle’s examination of pity and fear in the Rhetoric, quoted at length above: that tragedy
forms a communal bond between the tragic hero and individuals in the audience, who are able to
pity and fear because they are like him. Because they can identify with the tragic hero, the
audience is able to feel pity and fear for him and themselves together, while recognizing their
own innocence from moral guilt along with the tragic hero through hamartia. At least this
imagined community of feeling seems germane to Aristotle’s understanding of catharsis and to
Shay’s method of therapy. In fact, Else bases his whole theory of catharsis on this connection
between the tragic hero and the audience. He claims that catharsis is the process by which we
exonerate the tragic hero, and only secondarily, ourselves. Based on my analysis of the ethical
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dimensions of actions inspired by thumos above (with which Else concurs), the tragic hero can
be said to be legally guilty of hamartema (“error”) rather than adikaia (injustice or crime).176
This allows the spectator to form a community of emotion with the tragic hero at least. In this
way, even a private reading of the tragedies could effect catharsis. Secondly, claiming an
individual and private catharsis runs against everything we know of the Greek communal nature
of the polis and Aristotle’s political view of tragedy. What happened in tragedy happened to the
audience as individuals only insofar as they were members of the larger polis. Lastly, Aristotle’s
silence on the matter is easily explained: he would not need to make reference to the communal
nature of catharsis, just as he makes no mention of certain other elements of drama (masks, for
example). He would simply take for granted that catharsis, as the effect of tragedy, would, like
tragedy, be a communal experience. The tragedies were performed at festivals where all of
Athens could watch them together; it would hardly make sense for catharsis to be merely an
individual and private experience. Furthermore, one would hardly expect individual and private
catharsis to be the result of the imitation of actions that are not individual but that are necessary
or probable. Ultimately, it makes far more sense to understand catharsis primarily in a
communal, political light, rather than an individual and subjective one.
In this chapter, we have presented and discussed several theories for the functioning of
catharsis presented by modern scholarship. Each of them either did not match Aristotle’s
position in the Politics and Poetics because it failed to take into account the cultural milieu in
which Attic tragedy took place. That said, each of the three theories that I examined has
Else 1963:438. Else writes: “The purification, that is, the proof of the purity of the hero’s motive in performing
an otherwise ‘unclean’ act, is presented to him, and his conscience accepts and certifies it to his emotions, issues a
license, so to speak, which says: ‘you may pity this man, for he is like us, a good man rather than a bad, and he is
καθαρός, free of pollution.’” My understanding of catharsis has it take place in a different order and adds a step to
Else’s: it assumes that we already realize that the tragic hero is like us, and once we conclude that the tragic hero is
katharos, we can then infer that we too are katharos, thus moderating thumos. This cognitive and moral aspect of
catharsis would come as part of the broader psychological catharsis based on the communalization of traumatic
narratives.
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elements of truth, and I hope that my understanding of catharsis synthesizes rather than entirely
supplants them. While I will not present such a synthesis at length, a cursory glance at each
theory will be adequate that such a synthesis is at least plausible. The purgative view of catharsis
captures the medical, therapeutic aspects of trauma treatment; after all, my theory rests on the
experience of a clinical psychologist. The purification theory captures the purifying element of
catharsis; my understanding of the nature of catharsis could be described as a purification of
thumos. The purification theory simply focuses too restrictively on pity and fear, rather than
viewing thumos as a whole as the subject of catharsis. The education theory perhaps fits my
analysis most closely. It is simply too cognitive in its focus and does not take into account the
emotional reality of catharsis. My understanding of catharsis, in fact, unites all three theories
into one broader system that more adequately explains both the cultural realities of ancient
Athens and Aristotle’s remarks on catharsis. The weakness of each of the three theories
presented above is the narrowness of view that each takes, partially in the theory’s analysis of
Aristotle, but primarily in its understanding of the nature of the culture of tragedy in Athens. Put
bluntly, each scholar assumed that his “normal” was also the “normal” state of affairs in ancient
Athens. On just such a subject, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote the following admonition to modern
classicists and historians:
If you are to venture to interpret the past you can do so only out of the fullest
exertion of the vigor of the present: only when you put forth your noblest qualities in
all their strength will you divine what is worth knowing and preserving in the past.
Like to like! Otherwise you will draw the past down to you.177
My analysis of several modern scholars on catharsis revealed that each of them assumed that the
tragic audience was “normal.” With Nietzsche, we must wonder if these scholars have drawn the
past down to their present, while others, who have known real-life tragic heroes intimately,
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though perhaps less learned in the facts and philosophies of the past, can more accurately explain
the nature of tragedy and catharsis. The practical experience of Doerries and Shay seems to
indicate a view of the functioning of catharsis that relies on the narrative structure of the muthos
shared in a communal experience of the tragedy. The elements of the muthos arouse pity and
fear, and the communalization of that pity and fear that renews sympathy. The key assumption
that distinguishes our analysis from that of the authors I have examined is that the audience
would have likely experienced traumatic wartime events of such gravity that they could relate to
the sufferings of the tragic hero.

Conclusion
This essay has argued that the Greeks experienced and understood combat trauma, and
that they used tragedy and the catharsis that it effected as a means of restoring the order of souls
traumatized in war. Our examination of the horrors of hoplite warfare should leave us with no
question that ancient warfare was no more clean, decent, or glorious than modern war. To treat
the trauma induced those horrors, the Greeks did indeed practice certain societal mechanisms,
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which our own society seems to so sadly lack. One of these was Attic tragedy. Certain of the
tragedies explicitly speak to military experience, but the very nature of the tragic genre itself is a
perfect portrayal of choices a soldier must make in combat. This is the case, I argue, with
tragedies that are not ostensibly related with warfare, such as the Oedipus. If this is the case, the
structure of the tragic narrative itself should imitate or re-present the sort of impossible choices
that soldiers face. Hamartia, a key element of tragedy according to Aristotle’s account,
represents just this situation. Hamartia serves to bring about an anagnorisis, and, in association
with this anagnorisis, a change in fortune, peripateia in Greek, for the tragic hero. The narrative
structure that presents these elements of the story brings about a certain pleasure. But more
importantly, the purpose or telos of tragedy is the working out of a certain catharsis, through pity
and fear, of such emotions. Aristotle’s remarks in the Politics on the end of mimetic arts in
general and tragedy in particular seem to indicate that it serves an educative function in the polis.
This statement should be taken quite loosely, however, as he says that it provides an emotional
rest from past labor and a preparation for future pains, rather than any strictly cognitive
education. If it provides this cleansing of the emotions, what emotions does it cleanse?
According to the Rhetoric, the emotions similar to pity and fear mentioned in the Poetics are all
thumetic emotions: all of those passions originate in the spirited part of the soul, or the thumos.
Thumos is the seat of the political passions in every human being, and even more specifically, the
passions most proper to the military profession. These passions are also the tragic emotions. An
analysis of their role in tragedy reveals that they almost universally drive the action of the plot
and exacerbate the hamartia, if they are not themselves part of the hamartia. They form the
perfect candidate for this place, because we do not assign moral blame to someone who has
committed a bad action out of thumos, as his action was due to a “necessary or natural” passion.
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Thus, thumos forms the perfect candidate for causing a tragic hero to run afoul of the hamartia in
himself and his surroundings. All of this also establishes thumos as the perfect target for
catharsis: that which brings about the tragedy can be cleansed by means of the tragedy. Having
concluded that catharsis is the restoration of balance in the thumos, I addressed several possible
theories that seek to explain how catharsis works, testing them against the definition we had
established. Each contains elements of truth, but was found lacking in explaining how catharsis
functions due to misunderstandings of the role of tragedy as an antidote to combat trauma. An
alternative theory, that catharsis functions through communalizing traumatic narratives, seems to
fit both Aristotle’s Poetics and the effective methods of modern clinical psychology as practiced
by Jonathan Shay and others.
Understanding combat trauma as integral to the tragic experience of the ancient
Athenians allows us to understand catharsis in a new way. Further, it notes the inseparable
connection between philosophy, art, and life in Aristotle’s thought and the practice of the
Athenian polis. The Greeks’ vision of an integrated education towards virtue, of course,
emphasized the “higher things” and the pursuit wisdom for its own sake, but it also stood guard
against the psychological ravages of war that would threaten the peace of the polis. Would that a
similar unity of thought and action might stand guard over the souls of our own soldiers, whose
minds have been ravaged by war.
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